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I. INTRODUCTION: MAPPING THE ORIGINS AND POTENTIAL FUTURE 
OF DEVELOPMENT 
International development is generally lauded as an altruistic 
global effort for the betterment of humankind. But it is national 
governments that give official development assistance, often to 
other governments. They do this for reasons of national interest, out 
of a common recognition of state responsibility to their own 
citizens, and as part of the international community. To this point, 
for example, the long title of the main United States government 
authority for foreign aid, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as 
amended—the very first sentence—is: “AN ACT To promote the 
foreign policy, security, and general welfare of the United States by 
assisting peoples of the world in their efforts toward economic 
development and internal and external security . . . .”1   
In 2019, the forty-five countries that make up the longstanding 
consortium of traditional donors of official development assistance 
 
 1. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (1961). 
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(ODA) to developing countries gave almost $156 billion in  
ODA funding for aid in other countries.2 This is an objectively very 
large sum (though it only comes to about 0.3% of their gross 
national incomes on average).3 What do the donor governments 
expect to come of their voluntary foreign assistance? What do  
the recipient governments and their citizens expect? Who is 
accountable for which inputs and which outputs? What does a state 
owe to its people? 
In international relations, purportedly longstanding principles 
have dictated that governments have absolute territorial 
sovereignty—absolute discretion on how to manage their internal 
governance and relationships with their citizens. Yet, throughout 
the history of the state, there have always been practical standards 
for legitimate and functional statehood. In the post-Cold War era, 
for various reasons, the international community recognized a state 
level “responsibility to protect” (R2P), acknowledging that there 
may be a limit to absolute sovereignty when a state’s failure  
or refusal to provide security to its own people—to respect  
and protect their liberty—creates domestic instability that  
threatens international security.4 In such circumstances, the 
international community may invoke R2P to justify international 
humanitarian intervention. 
A separate discourse that predates but has not progressed as 
much as R2P concerns state and international responsibilities 
regarding international development assistance. Human rights 
advocates and developing countries have asserted a human “right 
to development” (RTD).5 Governments of more economically 
advanced countries (hereinafter, “donor governments”) have 
balked at the assertion of development as a right, out of fear that 
this concept could be used to create a binding international 
commitment to provide development assistance—which would 
 
 2. Net ODA, OECD ILIBRARY, https://data.oecd.org/chart/6doV (last visited 
Dec. 25, 2020). 
 3. Id. 
 4. INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY  
TO PROTECT: REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION  
AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY (2001) [hereinafter COMM’N ON INTERVENTION], 
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf; see also S.C. Res. 1973 (Mar. 17, 
2011), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973(2011). 
 5. G.A. Res. 41/128, Declaration on the Right to Development (Dec. 4, 1986), 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/righttodevelopment.aspx. 
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effectively compel them to provide development assistance and 
undermine their foreign policy discretion. 
This Article proposes to link the discourses with a new concept: 
a “responsibility to develop” (R2D), as a necessary corollary to R2P 
and a logical counterpart to RTD. It will review the history of state 
sovereignty, demonstrating that it has always entailed domestic 
and international commitments. It will then summarize the related 
histories of domestic governance of the state at home and 
“development” abroad to identify the state practices that have been 
at least implicitly accepted as necessary for legitimate statehood. 
II. SOVEREIGNTY: THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL AND 
DOMESTIC LEGITIMACY OF THE STATE (OR) HOW ABSOLUTE 
TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY WAS NEVER REALLY A THING 
State sovereignty has always carried domestic responsibilities, 
and the international community has always recognized 
international implications of domestic governance. As the concept 
of states evolved to obtain their legitimacy through popular 
sovereignty—the will of the people—this recognition became all 
the more relevant, notwithstanding brief assertions otherwise that 
were never followed in practice.6 The international community can 
set binding standards for domestic governance—for the state’s 
relationship with its people. In fact, it always has. 
A. The Enlightenment Era 
1. Individual rights at the inception of the state 
Conventional wisdom cites the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia as the 
origin of the nation-state system, and often alludes to it as the 
foundation of the concept of absolute domestic territorial 
sovereignty and non-intervention by the international community 
regarding domestic matters. But that is incomplete and 
misleading.7 For most of the history of the nation-state, 
international recognition was conditioned on domestic conduct. 
The first treaty recognition of absolute, unconditional domestic 
 
 6. The idea of absolute domestic territorial sovereignty has been asserted much more 
than it was ever followed. See infra Section I.B.1. 
 7. LUKE GLANVILLE, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: A NEW 
HISTORY 49 (2014). 
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territorial sovereignty did not occur until the 1920 Covenant of the 
League of Nations, where the state parties agreed “to respect and 
preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and 
existing political independence of all Members of the League.”8 But 
a brief survey of actual state practice over the past 500 years reflects 
that the international community has always had certain 
expectations for domestic governance. 
State recognition of individual liberties domestically has been a 
matter of international concern since the inception of the state. 
Dating back to the Protestant Reformation in Europe in the 1520s, 
there has been a consistent question of the state’s treatment of 
religion, or individual liberty originally in service of religion. 
Contemporary review of the Treaty of Westphalia shows that, by 
its own terms and immediate effect, it established the idea of 
international expectations of domestic governance and the 
individual civil right of the free exercise of religion. For that matter, 
the idea of free will of an individual (initially as a necessary element 
of the practice of religion) goes back still centuries further, to at least 
St. Augustine’s On the Free Choice of the Will around AD 395. The 
1555 Treaty of Augsburg expressly established that rulers within 
the Holy Roman Empire could dictate the religion of their regions, 
“cuius regio eius religio” (he who rules, his is the religion), setting the 
stage for the Thirty Years’ War (1618–48) between Catholic and 
Protestant states.9 The Treaty of Westphalia, which ended that war, 
included a section on “Liberty of Conscience,” requiring the state 
parties (the German princely states of the Holy Roman Empire) to 
tolerate the free exercise of religion of their subjects, i.e., to accept 
and not discriminate against religious minorities (specifically, 
Protestant or Catholic, within their jurisdictions).10 Far from 
establishing absolute sovereignty over territory, it codified an 
individual civil right: freedom of religion. So, if anything, the 
 
 8. Id. at 85; The Covenant of the League of Nations: Article 10, YALE L. SCH. LILLIAN 
GOLDMAN L. LIBR., https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2020). 
 9. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: A HISTORY 77 (Brendan Simms & D.J.B. Trim 
eds., 2011); GLANVILLE, supra note 7, at 51–52. 
 10. GLANVILLE, supra note 7, at 51–52 (quoting the Treaty of Osnabruck 1969  
art. XXVIII, 228–29); see also Treaty of Westphalia art. XXVIII, The Avalon Project, 
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/westphal.asp. The Treaty of Westphalia had 
two parts: The Treaty of Osnabruck and the Treaty of Muenster; the clause is in the 
former part. 
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Treaty of Westphalia stands for the principle of states’ acceptance 
of domestic governance responsibilities and the international 
community’s willingness to hold them accountable for it. 
2. Popular sovereignty: State legitimacy through the will of the people 
The next step in the evolution of sovereignty was domestic: 
popular sovereignty. Several Enlightenment-era revolutions 
posited that the legitimacy of the state should come from the 
consent of the governed and its representation of the general will 
of the people. The concept built steadily through influential 
treatises and state practice. 
In 1651, Thomas Hobbes wrote in Leviathan that the state is 
responsible for the security of its people, on behalf of its people: 
The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able 
to defend them from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries 
of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by 
their owne industrie, and by the fruites of the Earth, they may 
nourish themselves and live contentedly; is, to conferre all their 
power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of 
men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto 
one Will . . . . This is more than Consent, or Concord; it is a reall 
Unitie of them all, in one and the same Person, made by Covenant 
of every man with every man . . . . This done, the Multitude so 
united in one Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH . . . . This is 
the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speake 
more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which wee owe, under 
the Immortall God, our peace and defence [,] . . . inabled to forme 
the wills of them all, to Peace at home, and mutuall ayd against 
their enemies abroad.11 
This is a clear assertion of a concept of state responsibility to 
protect its people. It is also a clear assertion that, respecting 
individuals’ liberty in a state of nature and free will to choose to 
collaborate with others, the state’s authority comes from acting on 
behalf of its people. 
An important next step in practice for state accountability to its 
people was the “Glorious” Revolution in England in 1688.  
It removed a Catholic king, James II, from power over the 
 
 11. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 160–61 (Lerner Publ’g Grp. 2018) (1651) (spelling and 
formatting in original). 
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majority-Protestant population, and placed important new 
limitations on the authority of the monarchy. The 1689 English Bill 
of Rights recognized “ancient rights and liberties” of the people 
individually and through their representatives in Parliament. 12 
These included certain civil and political rights, such as free 
elections; Parliament’s power to make laws; freedom of speech 
within Parliament; the right of petition; and prohibitions of 
excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishments.13 
In the same period, John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government 
(1689) elaborated on the legitimacy of the English government, 
specifically, Parliament. It starts with natural rights of man: 
asserting a law of nature for all mankind, “that being all equal and 
independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, 
liberty, or possessions.”14 These individuals exchange some of their 
natural liberty for “the bonds of civil society” to “unite into a 
community, for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one 
amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a 
greater security against any that are not of it.”15 This civil society, 
in turn, has the authority to remove its representative government, 
to hold it accountable: 
[T]here remains still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter 
the legislative, when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust 
reposed in them. For all power given with trust for the attaining an 
end, being limited by that end, whenever that end is manifestly 
neglected, or opposed, the trust must necessarily be forfeited, and 
the power devolve into the hands of those that gave it . . . .16 
Thus framed, a representative government receives its 
legitimacy from popular sovereignty, with a duty to serve the 
general will of the people. In other words, it owes a duty of care to 
its people. 
 
 12. English Bill of Rights 1689, YALE L. SCH. LILLIAN GOLDMAN L. LIBR., 
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/england.asp (last visited Nov. 16, 2020);  
John D. Bessler, A Century in the Making: The Glorious Revolution, the American Revolution, and 
the Origins of the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment, 27 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 989, 
1015 (2019). 
 13. Bessler, supra note 12, at 1015. 
 14. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 4 (Richard Cox ed., 1982). 
 15. Id. at 58. 
 16. Id. at 92. 
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Next in the progression of Western thought, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau’s On the Social Contract (1762) put forward ideas echoed 
in the American and French revolutions. First, he explained, 
legitimacy matters: 
Force is a physical power; I fail to see what morality can result 
from its effects. To give in to force is an act of necessity, not of 
will . . . . If one must obey because of force, one need not do so out 
of duty; and if one is no longer forced to obey, one is no longer 
obliged. Clearly then, this word “right” adds nothing to force . . . . 
Let us then agree that force does not bring about right and that 
one is obliged to obey only legitimate powers.17 
That legitimacy is determined by the general will: 
Each of us places his person and all his power in common under the 
supreme direction of the general will . . . . At once, in place of the 
individual person of each contracting party, this act of association 
produces a moral and collective body . . . which receives from this 
same act its unity, its common self, its life and its will. This public 
person, formed thus . . . is called state by its members when it is 
passive, sovereign when it is active . . . . As for the associates, they 
collectively take the name people; individually they are called 
citizens, insofar as they are participants in the sovereign authority, 
and subjects, insofar as they are subjected to the laws of the state.18 
Thus, according to Rousseau, the representative state owes its 
people something—something agreed to and consolidated into the 
general will. 
The United States Declaration of Independence in 1776 
similarly framed the legitimacy of the state on accountability to the 
people based on its effectiveness in ensuring individual rights: 
WE hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are 
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness—That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted 
among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the 
Governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes 
destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to 
abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its Foundation 
 
 17. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 71–72 (Donald A. Cress 
trans., 2d ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 2019). 
 18. Id. at 80. 
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on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to 
them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.19 
The U.S. Constitution in 1787 itself further emphasized the 
principle that sovereignty was bestowed on the state by the people, 
for the benefit of the people: 
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more 
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, 
provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, 
and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, 
do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States 
of America.20 
Before even getting into the details of a Bill of Rights—and, 
later, a proposed second Bill of Rights—the founding documents 
indicate a duty placed by the people onto the state to provide 
domestic stability, security, individual liberty, and other elements 
deemed necessary for the common good. Similarly, at the outset of 
the French Revolution, the French National Assembly approved the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen in 1789, which 
asserted, “The aim of all political association is the preservation of 
the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are 
liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression.”21  
The political philosophy of the Enlightenment era established 
the baseline for modern political thought. As demonstrated by the 
way these ideas have been enshrined in the founding documents of 
England and the United States, and the way they have since come 
into common acceptance by other states, the legitimacy of a state 
government founded on popular sovereignty is tied to its 
commitment to respect certain individual rights. 
3. A brief counter-revolution: A short period of opportunistic reactionary 
non-intervention that was notable for multiple interventions 
The idea that a state’s legitimacy is based on popular 
sovereignty was a clear threat to non-democratic governments. 
Predictably, democratically illegitimate regimes responded by 
 
 19. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added). 
 20. The Constitution of the United States: A Transcription, NAT’L ARCHIVES (May 4, 2020), 
https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript. 
 21. Declaration of the Rights of Man—1789: Article 2, YALE L. SCH. LILLIAN GOLDMAN L. 
LIBR., https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp (last visited Nov. 16, 2020). 
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asserting that questions of state legitimacy are purely domestic 
issues and none of the business of the international community. The 
idea of absolute domestic territorial sovereignty thus became a 
useful tool for democratically illegitimate regimes or purposes. 
As part of France’s popular revolution, the French National 
Assembly even went so far as to issue the Edict of Fraternity in 1792, 
promising “fraternity and aid to all peoples who wish to recover 
their liberty.”22 They went too far. The domestic politics of one 
country, France, became a direct threat to the security of other states 
and international stability. 
The resulting Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars led to the 
Congress of Vienna in 1815, which redrew territorial borders 
among the five Great Powers (France, Britain, Russia, Austria, and 
Prussia) and expressly reaffirmed monarchical, or dynastic, rule—
a direct repudiation of one of the fundamental pillars of popular 
sovereignty, the right of the people to replace their government.23 
To be clear, this was not some significant intellectual shift. It was 
not even initially proposed by the allied Great Powers who 
defeated Napoleon in 1814. It was a strategic argument by France’s 
representative, Charles-Maurice Tallyrand, to force those other 
four Great Powers to recognize a restored French monarchy, in 
light of their own claims to territorial sovereignty.24 He argued that 
France had been  motivated by its advocacy of sovereignty of the 
people, and the effect of the agreements of the 1815 Vienna 
Congress—specifically, the “Final Act of the Congress”—was to 
maintain the domestic monarchies.25 The Final Act reaffirmed 
monarchical rule in Europe; therefore, the King of France should be 
reinstated and its territorial integrity also respected.26 Thus, the 
representative of France, which had previously justified foreign 
intervention based on the principle of state legitimacy based on 
popular sovereignty, argued: 
 
 22. GLANVILLE, supra note 7, at 71. 
 23. CHRISTIAN REUS-SMIT, THE MORAL PURPOSE OF THE STATE: CULTURE, SOCIAL 
IDENTITY, AND INSTITUTIONAL RATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 136–39 (1999). The 
Vienna Congress did many other things, too, including laying down an international marker 
of opposition to slavery on moral and humanitarian grounds. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 137. 
3.KHARDORI_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2021  1:00 AM 
1037 What Does the State Owe to Its People? 
 1037 
 
The presence of a minister of Louis XVIII[, the king of France, by 
birthright,] consecrates here the principle upon which all social 
order rests. The first need of Europe is to banish forever the 
opinion that right can be acquired by conquest alone, and to cause 
the revival of that sacred principle of legitimacy from which all 
order and stability spring. To show today that France troubles 
your deliberations, would be to say that true principles are no 
longer the only ones that guide you, and that you are unwilling to 
be just.27 
And so, a group of monarchs agreed among themselves that 
monarchs are legitimate and revolutions against them are not. This 
is best understood, however, as a historical blip, not an actual 
change in the trajectory of the perceived legitimacy of state power. 
These monarchs asserted that no state should intervene to 
support a popular revolution within another state. But they did not 
establish any agreed principle or practice of non-intervention—of 
complete deference to the internal governance of any state. They 
very much recognized that “the internal politics of states could 
represent a grave threat to international order.”28 They were far 
from the pre-Westphalian expectation of absolute sovereignty of a 
monarch. In fact, the practice was the opposite. 
In the 1820s, three of the Great Powers—Russia, Prussia, and 
Austria—formed a “Holy Alliance” to agree to intervene against 
popular uprisings. They did so in Spain in 1820–21.29 In a joint 
declaration, they rationalized that they had come “to the assistance 
of a subdued Peoples, and they considered it as coming in support 
of their liberty, and not as an attack against their independence . . . 
the object of that policy will always be the preservation of the 
Independence and of the rights of each State.”30 In other words, 
they intervened in a matter of domestic stability based on concern 
for international security.   
The Great Powers also intervened repeatedly in the affairs and 
territory of the Ottoman Empire to protect the religious freedom of 
 
 27. Id. at 137–38. 
 28. GLANVILLE, supra note 7, at 75. 
 29. Id.; HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 9, at 122. 
 30. GERRY SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES: UNEQUAL SOVEREIGNS IN 
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 253 (2004) (quoting the Declaration of the Allied 
Sovereigns of Austria, Prussia and Russia (Laybach), 12 May 1821, in EDWARD HERTSLET, 
THE MAP OF EUROPE BY TREATY 667–69 (1875)); GLANVILLE, supra note 7, at 75. 
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the minority Christians. Russia took the role of protector of 
orthodox Christians. The Crimean War between Russia and an 
Ottoman-British alliance ended with the 1856 Treaty of Paris. That 
treaty recognized the Ottoman Empire’s sovereignty, required 
Russia to demilitarize the Black Sea, and required the Ottoman 
Empire to establish domestic religious freedom and non-
discrimination against Christians in certain areas (e.g., taxation and 
eligibility for public service).31 In 1860, in response to mass killings 
of around 2,000 Christians in Damascus over a one-week period, 
France advocated for joint European intervention for the purpose 
“of obtaining the satisfaction due to humanity, and of assisting in the 
reestablishment of peace in Syria.” 32 France negotiated with the other 
European powers and the Ottoman Empire for consent for 12,000 
European troops (half from France) to enter Ottoman territories to 
end the pogroms against Christians. France obtained Ottoman 
consent after explaining “that the reasons for the intervention were 
related to the manifest impotence of the Ottoman authorities, which 
made foreign help required if the collapse of the Ottoman Empire 
were to be avoided.”33 By the time the troops actually arrived, the 
killing had ended, and the troops found themselves carrying out 
humanitarian activities, such as burying the dead and cleaning up 
the wreckage.34 This episode presents an early example of 
humanitarian intervention based on a mutually agreed failure of a 
state’s responsibility to protect certain guaranteed domestic rights 
(in this case, the civil right of religious freedom). 
4. Non-intervention in the public discourse: The long history of talk by 
commentators (with no relation to the actual actions of governments) 
Though hardly ever implemented in practice, the idea of non-
intervention has a long history in theory. The question of whether 
to intervene into the domestic affairs of another state predates the 
Westphalian state itself. Hugo Grotius rationalized in his 1625 
foundational treatise, On the Law of War and Peace (de jure belli ac 
pacis), if “a prince ‘should inflict upon his subjects such treatment 
 
 31. Treaty of Paris of 1856 art. IX, Mar. 30, 1856, https://content.ecf.org.il/files/ 
M00934_TreatyOfParis1856English.pdf; HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 9, at 186. 
 32. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 9, at 173. 
 33. Id. at 173–74. 
 34. Id. at 175–76. 
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as no one is warranted in inflicting, the exercise of the right vested 
in human society is not precluded.’”35 In other words, when a 
sovereign mistreats his people, the international community 
outside his kingdom might have a right to intervene. 
By contrast, the idea of absolute sovereignty over a territory is 
attributed to Emmerich de Vattel and his contemporary, Christian 
Wolff. Vattel’s treatise, The Law of Nations, published in 1758, used 
popular sovereignty as an argument against intervention. 
He asserted:   
A nation then is mistress of her own actions so long as they 
do not affect the proper and perfect rights of any other nation—
so long as she is only internally bound, and does not lie under any 
external and perfect obligation. If she makes an ill use of her liberty, 
she is guilty of a breach of duty; but other nations are bound  
to acquiesce in her conduct, since they have no right to dictate 
to her.36 
If a state is internally legitimate, Vattel opines that there should 
be no space for external input on its conduct. That was his opinion, 
notwithstanding the actual state practice in seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century Europe. Simms and Trim put it best: “[T]he 
concept of inviolable state sovereignty was not so much elaborated 
by Wolff and Vattel as simply invented by them.”37 That said, even 
Vattel conceded that there may be a basis for intervention for civil 
war or crimes against humanity—specifically, violation of the civil 
right of freedom of religion.38 
A century later, another prominent proponent of non-
intervention, J.S. Mill, argued against intervention against another 
state if that state’s government is legitimized by popular 
sovereignty (i.e., represents the will of the people). At the same 
time, he conceded that popular sovereignty depends upon the 
condition of domestic liberty of the people within the state—how 
free and able they are to shape their government. That domestic 
 
 35. Id. at 40 (quoting HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS 584 (Francis W. Kelsey 
trans., 1925) (1625)). 
 36. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS lxiii (Joseph Chitty ed., 1844) (1758), 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Lieber_Collection/pdf/DeVattel_LawOfNati
ons.pdf#page=60. 
 37. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 9, at 91 (citing Stephen D. Krasner, 
Rethinking the Sovereign State Model, 27 REV. INT’L STUDS. 17 (2001)). 
 38. VATTEL, supra note 36, at 55. 
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liberty depends on the level of “civilization” of the people.39 Thus, 
he advocated for popular sovereignty, while defending colonialism 
as a form of international development assistance. Granted, to be 
charitable, his language was representative of his time and place as 
a British colonial officer in India. In his 1859 essay, A Few Words on 
Non-Intervention, Mill rationalized that if a state is legitimate by 
way of popular sovereignty, i.e., reflecting the general will of the 
people, then it ought to be able to stand on its own; it should not 
need or expect external intervention to maintain stability. 40 If 
anything, as long as it is not causing harm in the international 
community, a state—along with all other states in the international 
community—has an interest in collective self-defense against any 
foreign intervention that seeks to alter the internally negotiated 
governing relationship between the state and its people.41 In a 
legitimate government, the expectations of the people and the 
duties of the state are a matter of internal negotiation. He wrote: 
With respect to the question, whether one country is justified 
in helping the people of another in a struggle against their 
government for free institutions[:] When the contest is only with 
native rulers, and with such native strength as those rulers can 
enlist in their defence, the answer I should give to the question of 
the legitimacy of intervention is, as a general rule, No. . . . The 
only test possessing any real value, of a people’s having become 
fit for popular institutions, is that they, or a sufficient portion of 
them to prevail in the contest, are willing to brave labour and 
danger for their liberation. I know all that may be said, I know it 
may be urged that the virtues of freemen cannot be learnt in the 
school of slavery, and that if a people are not fit for freedom,  
to have any chance of becoming so they must first be free.  
And this would be conclusive, if the intervention recommended 
would really give them freedom. But the evil is, that if they have  
not sufficient love of liberty to be able to wrest it from  
merely domestic oppressors, the liberty which is bestowed on 
them by other hands than their own, will have nothing real, 
nothing permanent.42 
 
 39. MICHAEL W. DOYLE, THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION: JOHN STUART MILL AND THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 222–23 (2015). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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To Mill, the government of a state is legitimate if based on the 
consent of the governed exercising their free will; that internal 
legitimacy cannot be externally imposed. He allowed for 
intervention against foreign invasion and civil wars as a matter of 
mutual self-defense and international security interests.43 Foreign 
intervention to establish freedom, he concluded, is wrong, but—
again, as an apologist for colonial occupations—he also argued that 
the state has a responsibility to groom its people for freedom. In his 
1856 treatise, On Liberty, he reasoned that the state may only restrict 
individuals in the exercise of their freedom insofar as they may 
harm others, but may restrict “uncivilized peoples” to the extent 
that the state actively helps them reach the so-called civilized state 
at which they are capable of exercising their liberty: 
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or 
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their 
number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power 
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. . . . 
[T]his doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the 
maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children . . . . 
Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by 
others, must be protected against their own actions as well as 
against external injury. For the same reason, we may leave out of 
consideration those backward states of society in which the race 
itself may be considered as in its nonage. . . . Despotism is a 
legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, 
provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified 
by actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no 
application to any state of things anterior to the time when 
mankind have become capable of being improved by free and 
equal discussion.44 
So, free people have the right and authority to legitimize their 
state. And toward that end, the state has a duty to respect and, as 
necessary, cultivate their capacity to exercise their freedom. This is 
an important argument in the history of foreign aid, which is very 
much rooted in colonial and missionary zeal, but it also informs 
 
 43. Id. at 221, 225. 
 44. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13–14 (1859). 
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present expectations of all states regarding the range of human 
rights: economic, social, cultural, political, and civil. 
All that said, these were just opinions of thinkers, not binding 
on the actions of states. They nevertheless demonstrate how 
attitudes towards sovereignty have shifted up to the current time 
and influenced modern state practice. 
B. The Modern Multilateral System 
The Enlightenment Era advanced the form and content of the 
state, including its relations with its people and with other states. It 
established the international community and began to outline what 
states should expect of other states in their relations with their 
people. It did not, however, establish a tradition of non-
intervention. Far from it. In the modern era, the international 
community created the multilateral system of international 
organizations to further define their expectations of domestic 
governance and mediate their international relations. The concept 
of absolute territorial sovereignty would become an artifact of the 
first failed attempt at forming the multilateral system. 
1. The League of Nations: The first, brief, limited recognition of absolute 
territorial sovereignty 
The international community unambiguously bound itself to 
non-intervention based on absolute territorial sovereignty for the 
first time in 1920—relatively recently in the history of the state—
and that decision had almost immediate, disastrous results. In the 
wake of World War I, the 1920 Covenant of the League of Nations 
stated, “The Members of the League undertake to respect and 
preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and 
existing political independence of all Members of the League.”45 
This absolute territorial sovereignty, without reference to any 
expectations of internal governance, was further bolstered by a 
stated principle of collective self-defense. Article 11 set out, “Any 
war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the 
Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of 
concern to the whole League.”46 The concept was nonbinding, but 
 
 45. League of Nations Covenant art. 10. 
 46. Id. art. 11; see also id. art. 16. 
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even so, it was too much for the United States Senate; a significant 
majority of Senators did not want the United States to be obliged to 
intervene. Even though the covenant was U.S. President Woodrow 
Wilson’s idea, the United States Senate refused to ratify it.47 This 
historical moment did not reject the possibility of humanitarian 
interventions or the responsibilities of states to their people, but it 
did reflect a recurring principle that influential states did not want 
to be bound or compelled to intervene. 
An interesting, little-known footnote to this story involves the 
International Relief Union. In 1922, an Italian representative to the 
League of Nations, who recalled surviving the Messina earthquake 
of 1908, proposed a sub-organ for the League that would 
implement a mutual commitment to humanitarian aid in response 
to natural disasters—he even initially termed it a “right to relief.”48 
Though not a party, the United States viewed this potential new 
norm as a threat to foreign policy discretion, so it worked with 
Britain’s representative to defeat it. They did not want to be 
obligated to intervene. One account summarized, 
[F]rom the outset, the United States had seen the . . . project as a 
dangerous foreign scheme that threatened US values by involving 
governments in disaster relief based on the idea of mutual 
insurance, and potentially jeopardized their determination to use 
disaster relief as an instrument of US foreign policy.49 
As much as the concept of absolute territorial sovereignty is 
touted as individual states’ protection against international 
intervention, it was also an excuse for the international community 
not to intervene. And it was only a very brief moment in the history 
of national and international rights and responsibilities. 
 
 47. The Senate and the League of Nations: Henry Cabot Lodge (1925), U.S. SENATE, 
https://www.senate.gov/reference/reference_item/Versailles.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 
2020) (summarizing Henry Cabot Lodge’s history of the Senate’s consideration of the Treaty 
of Versailles). 
 48. John F. Hutchinson, Disasters and the International Order—II: The International Relief 
Union, 23 INT’L HIST. REV. 253, 261 (2001). 
 49. Id. at 281. 
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2. The United Nations: The post–World War II reemergence of state 
responsibilities to their people and to each other 
Just two decades later, the 1945 United Nations Charter set off 
a march back to international expectations for the domestic conduct 
of a state, eventually introducing the concept of “failed states” and 
culminating with “the Responsibility to Protect.”50  
The Charter establishing the United Nations in the wake of 
World War II maintained respect for territorial sovereignty, but 
significantly strengthened the collective self-defense mechanism. It 
also reversed course from the League of Nations by setting up 
universal expectations for domestic governance. Article 2(4) states, 
“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations.”51 Further echoing the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, with a significant addition, 
Article 2(7) adds, 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the 
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present 
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII [Security Council 
measures, including use of force].52 
The Charter promises non-intervention, but also recognizes the 
potential for domestic matters to create international security 
threats. Chapter VII discusses potential international threats and 
options for collective self-defense. Article 39 authorizes the U.N. 
Security Council to “determine the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”53 Article 41 
authorizes the Security Council to impose economic sanctions, 
restrict travel and communication, or restrict diplomatic relations.54 
Article 42 authorizes use of force: If Article 41 responses are 
 
 50. U.N. Charter; Gerald B. Helman & Steven R. Ratner, Saving Failed States, 
89 FOREIGN POL’Y 3 (1992); COMM’N ON INTERVENTION, supra note 4. 
 51. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
 52. Id. art. 2, ¶ 7. 
 53. Id. art. 39. 
 54. Id. art. 41. 
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insufficient, the Security Council “may take such action by air, sea, 
or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.”55 And Article 51 acknowledges 
“the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an 
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.”56 So, 
the Charter forecloses interference into domestic affairs, but 
contemplates action to respond to threats that cross borders. 
For the next fifty years, the Cold War era, the questions of when 
a country had crossed a line to be a threat to international security 
warranting some sort of intervention focused on outward acts of 
aggression and conflicts between governments, not internal 
conflicts of governments with non-state actors, including their own 
citizens.57 From 1945 to 1992, whatever the debates on the merits 
were, proposals for intervention were vetoed in the Security 
Council 279 times.58 This very short period in the history of 
sovereignty ended with the fall of the Soviet Union and the “third 
wave” of democratization in the late 1980s and 1990s. 
 
a. Bringing state capacity back in: Responding to “failed states” and 
“fragile states.” By the early 1990s, the international relations lexicon 
gained terms like “fragile states” and “failed states.” Once again, 
domestic governance—including the lack thereof—was 
acknowledged as a source of threats to international peace and 
security. In an oft-cited defining 1992 article, Saving Failed States, 
Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner (a former U.S. Ambassador to 
the United Nations and an attorney in the U.S. Department of 
State’s Office of the Legal Adviser, respectively) observed, 
[A] disturbing new phenomenon is emerging: the failed nation-
state, utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the 
international community. Civil strife, government breakdown, 
and economic privation are creating more and more modem 
debellatios, the term used in describing the destroyed German state 
 
 55. Id. art. 42. 
 56. Id. art. 51. 
 57. See, e.g., Charter of the United Nations: Chapter VII—Action with Respect to Threats to 
the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression, Article 39 & 51, CODIFICATION DIV. 
PUBL’NS REPERTORY OF PRAC. OF U.N. ORGANS (Aug. 23, 2016) https://legal.un.org/ 
repertory/art39.shtml (summarizing practices since 1945). 
 58. U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and 
Peace-Keeping: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 (June 17, 1992). 
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after World War II. As those states descend into violence and 
anarchy—imperiling their own citizens and threatening their 
neighbors through refugee flows, political instability, and random 
warfare—it is becoming clear that something must be done. The 
massive abuses of human rights—including that most basic of 
rights, the right to life—are distressing enough, but the need to 
help those states is made more critical by the evidence that their 
problems tend to spread. Although alleviating the developing 
world’s suffering has long been a major task, saving failed states 
will prove a new—and in many ways different—challenge.59 
For several reasons, the number of democratic governments in 
the world increased dramatically during this period. Many of these 
new democracies welcomed development assistance in the form of 
democracy-promotion support from abroad. Donor governments 
responded. For example, until this period, the United States 
Government did not have any expressly stated democracy-
promotion authorities. In quick succession between 1985 and 1992, 
the U.S. Congress passed the Central America Democracy, Peace, 
and Development Initiative; the Support for East European 
Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989; and the Freedom for Russia and 
Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets (FREEDOM) 
Support Act of 1992.60 
There was also a shift in views on access for humanitarian aid 
for domestic crises (e.g., famine and internal displacement). In 1986, 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held in Nicaragua v. United 
States that assistance provided by the United States to the military 
and paramilitary activities of the contras in Nicaragua through 1984 
was “a clear breach of the principle of non-intervention,” but added 
in what some consider dicta, 
The Court has however taken note that, with effect from the 
beginning of the United States governmental financial year 1985 
. . . , the United States Congress has restricted the use of funds 
appropriated for assistance to the contras to “humanitarian 
assistance” . . . . There can be no doubt that the provision of 
strictly humanitarian aid to persons or forces in another country, 
 
 59. Helman & Ratner, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 3. 
 60. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, Title VII, Pub. 
L. No. 99–83, § 701, 99 Stat. 190; Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989, 
Pub. L. No. 101-179, 103 Stat. 1298; Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies 
and Open Markets Support Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-511, 106 Stat. 3320. 
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whatever their political affiliations or objectives, cannot be 
regarded as unlawful intervention, or as in any other way 
contrary to international law.61 
The ICJ thus countenanced the idea that foreign assistance to 
mitigate the suffering of a state’s population would not necessarily 
be a violation of its territorial or political sovereignty. It would not 
necessarily undermine the state’s responsibility for the security of 
its people, but it could help mitigate the consequences of its 
apparent failure toward that end. 
In multiple resolutions, the U.N. General Assembly 
emphasized that states should allow and even facilitate foreign 
humanitarian aid. The 1990 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 
45/100 acknowledged territorial and political sovereignty, but 
“[i]nvite[d] all States whose populations are in need of such 
assistance to facilitate the work of these organizations in 
implementing humanitarian assistance, in particular the supply of 
food, medicines and health care, for which access to victims is 
essential.”62 Soon after that, the U.N. Security Council (SC) issued 
binding resolutions demanding humanitarian access in Iraq, 
Bosnia, and Somalia. U.N. SC Resolution 688 (1991) “[i]nsist[ed] 
that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian 
organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq 
and make available all necessary facilities for their operations.”63 
U.N. SC Resolution 770 (1992), regarding Bosnia, “[d]emand[ed] 
that unimpeded and continuous access to all camps, prisons and 
detention centres be granted immediately to . . . relevant 
humanitarian organizations and that all detainees therein receive 
humane treatment, including adequate food, shelter and medical 
 
 61. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 242 (June 27). The ICJ relied on a definition of “humanitarian 
assistance” provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) referring to 
“assistance . . . to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its 
purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being.” Id. The 
Court also highlighted Congress’s legislative text limiting U.S. intervention going forward: 
It could include “the provision of food, clothing, medicine, and other humanitarian 
assistance, and it does not include the provision of weapons, weapons systems, ammunition, 
or other equipment, vehicles, or material which can be used to inflict serious bodily harm or 
death.” Id. ¶ 243. 
 62. G.A. Res. 45/100, ¶ 4 (Dec. 14, 1990) (“Humanitarian assistance to victims of 
natural disasters and similar emergency situations.”). 
 63. S.C. Res. 688, ¶ 3 (Apr. 5, 1991). 
3.KHARDORI_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)  3/28/2021  1:00 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:4 (2021) 
1048 
 
care“64 and “that all parties and others concerned take the necessary 
measures to ensure the safety of . . . personnel engaged in the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance.”65 U.N. SC Resolution 794 
(1992) on Somalia demanded “that all parties, movements and 
factions in Somalia take all measures necessary to facilitate the 
efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and 
humanitarian organizations to provide urgent humanitarian 
assistance to the affected population in Somalia.”66 This resolution 
actually went further: it expressly authorized the use of force to 
ensure the safety of humanitarian aid personnel.67 
In his 1992 report, An Agenda for Peace, U.N. Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali made a foundational argument for access for 
the international community when there is a void created by a 
state’s failure to carry out its responsibilities: the international 
community should respect states’ territorial sovereignty, but states 
should accept that when their internal governance has international 
effects, at a certain point they will need to accept and facilitate an 
international response. The report observed,   
The foundation-stone of [peace] is and must remain the State. 
Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any 
common international progress. The time of absolute and exclusive 
sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never matched by 
reality. It is the task of leaders of States today to understand this and to 
find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the 
requirements of an ever more interdependent world. . . . 
. . . . 
In . . . situations of internal crisis the United Nations will need 
to respect the sovereignty of the State; to do otherwise would not 
be in accordance with the understanding of Member States in 
accepting the principles of the Charter. The Organization must 
remain mindful of the carefully negotiated balance of the guiding 
principles . . . that humanitarian assistance must be provided in 
accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and 
impartiality; that the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national 
unity of States must be fully respected in accordance with the 
 
 64. S.C. Res. 770, ¶ 3 (Aug. 13, 1992). 
 65. Id. ¶ 6. 
 66. S.C. Res. 794, ¶ 2 (Dec. 3, 1992). 
 67. Id. ¶¶ 3, 10, 16. 
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Charter of the United Nations; and that, in this context, 
humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of 
the affected country and, in principle, on the basis of an appeal by 
that country.68 
Domestic governance affects international security. “Absolute 
and exclusive sovereignty” was never actually absolute. States have 
a responsibility to take care of “victims of emergencies occurring 
on their territory,” and that responsibility includes asking for 
humanitarian aid when needed or, at least, allowing humanitarian 
aid providers access to people in need—and that aid would not be 
a breach of sovereignty.69 This principle echoes both the 1856 
French assertion to the Ottoman Empire regarding minority 
religious rights and the 1986 ICJ Nicaragua v. United States opinion 
that humanitarian aid does not violate sovereignty.70 
The international community responded inadequately to 
several domestic state failures in the 1990s, including Bosnia, 
Somalia, and Rwanda, among others. Before the September 11, 
2001, attacks on the World Trade Center, Robert Kaplan warned of 
“The Coming Anarchy” the world would experience as a 
consequence of failed states, using Sierra Leone as an example.71 At 
the end of that decade, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan gave his 
Two Sovereignties speech. Addressing the U.N. General Assembly in 
1999, he sought to recognize a sovereignty of individuals, as well 
as sovereignty of states, and a responsibility for states and the 
international community to be responsive to it: 
State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined 
by the forces of globalization and international cooperation. The 
State is now widely understood to be the servant of its people, and 
not vice versa. At the same time, individual sovereignty—and by this 
I mean the human rights and fundamental freedoms of each and every 
individual as enshrined in our Charter—has been enhanced by a 
 
 68. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 58, ¶¶ 17, 30 (emphasis added). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Boutros-Ghali thus effectively called back to the pre–League of Nations era—
within limits. He also suggested that the world should not re-create the French revolutionary 
wars: “The United Nations has not closed its door. Yet if every ethnic, religious or linguistic 
group claimed statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation, and peace, security and 
economic well-being for all would become ever more difficult to achieve.” Id. ¶ 17. 
 71. Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy, ATLANTIC (Feb. 1994), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/02/the-coming-anarchy/304670/. 
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renewed consciousness of the right of every individual to control 
his or her own destiny. 
. . . . 
Nothing in the Charter precludes a recognition that there are 
rights beyond borders. Indeed, its very letter and spirit are the 
affirmation of those fundamental human rights. In short, it is not 
the deficiencies of the Charter which have brought us to this 
juncture, but our difficulties in applying its principles to a new 
era; an era when strictly traditional notions of sovereignty can no 
longer do justice to the aspirations of peoples everywhere to attain 
their fundamental freedoms.72 
By this point, it should be clear that nothing in his speech was 
new: Secretary-General Annan was referring to the responsibilities 
of a state to its people. He described the now-axiomatic concept that 
a state’s legitimacy should come from popular sovereignty—the 
consent of the governed—and that the state must respect and even 
cultivate the individual liberties of the governed in order to obtain 
their consent.   
In the United States, the final National Security Strategy of the 
Clinton administration highlighted failed states, observing, 
At times in the new century, we can expect that, despite 
international prevention efforts, some states will be unable to 
provide basic governance, safety and security, and opportunities 
for their populations, potentially generating internal conflict, 
mass migration, famine, epidemic diseases, environmental 
disasters, mass killings and aggression against neighboring states 
or ethnic groups – events which can threaten regional security and 
U.S. interests.73 
Clinton’s successor, George W. Bush, had campaigned on a 
non-interventionist foreign policy platform but would also 
recognize the security threat posed by failed states in the wake of 
the 9/11 attacks. His first national security strategy flatly stated, 
 
 72. Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Secretary-General Presents  
His Annual Report to General Assembly, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/7136/GA/9596  
(Sept. 20, 1999) (emphasis added). 
 73. WHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR A NEW CENTURY 2 (1999), 
https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/media/pdf/nssr-1299.pdf. 
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“America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are 
by failing ones.”74 
The actual longstanding global consensus had returned: 
absolute territorial sovereignty for domestically unstable states 
posed too much of a risk to international security. 
 
b. Defining the “responsibility to protect.” In December 2001 (after 
years of work that pre-dated 9/11, made all the more urgent by it), 
the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS), a working group tasked by the U.N. Secretary 
General, published their report formally introducing the term, “the 
responsibility to protect.”75 It further emphasized the renewed 
international consensus that state legitimacy must be based on 
popular sovereignty, which creates certain responsibilities for the 
state toward its people, asserting: 
The defense of state sovereignty, by even its strongest supporters, 
does not include any claim of the unlimited power of a state to do 
what it wants to its own people. . . . It is acknowledged that 
sovereignty implies a dual responsibility: externally—to respect 
the sovereignty of other states, and internally, to respect the 
dignity and basic rights of all the people within the state. In 
international human rights covenants, in UN practice, and in state 
practice itself, sovereignty is now understood as embracing this 
dual responsibility. Sovereignty as responsibility has become the 
minimum content of good international citizenship. 
This modern understanding of the meaning of sovereignty is of 
central importance in the Commission’s approach to the question 
of intervention for human protection purposes, and in particular 
in the development of our core theme, “the responsibility to 
protect” . . . .76 
As much as the ensuing discourse on “responsibility to protect” 
(R2P) has focused on security, it bears noting that the original 
definition in the ICISS report is expansive. In popular sovereignty, 
the people give legitimacy to the state, and the state in turn 
provides security—it protects their liberty. As defined by the ICISS, 
 
 74. WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 1 (2002), https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf. 
 75. COMM’N ON INTERVENTION, supra note 4. 
 76. Id. ¶¶ 1.35, 1.36. 
3.KHARDORI_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)  3/28/2021  1:00 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:4 (2021) 
1052 
 
liberty is more than just physical security: “Human security  
means the security of people—their physical safety, their  
economic and social well-being, respect for their dignity and worth 
as human beings, and the protection of their human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.”77   
R2P also reframes sovereignty78 from a question of foreign 
intervention into one of domestic legitimacy; rather than negating 
potential international action, it demands affirmative domestic 
action. The ICISS report concluded, 
[T]he debate about intervention for human protection purposes 
should focus not on “the right to intervene” but on “the 
responsibility to protect.” The proposed change in terminology is 
also a change in perspective, reversing the perceptions inherent in 
the traditional language, and adding some additional ones: 
First, the responsibility to protect implies an evaluation  
of the issues from the point of view of those seeking or 
needing support, rather than those who may be  
considering intervention. . . . 
Secondly, the responsibility to protect acknowledges that the 
primary responsibility in this regard rests with the state 
concerned, and that it is only if the state is unable or unwilling 
to fulfill this responsibility, or is itself the perpetrator, that it 
becomes the responsibility of the international community to 
act in its place. . . .79 
This acknowledgment of an internal responsibility was 
significant. It shifted sovereignty from a myopic focus on foreign 
intervention to a comprehensive survey of human, national, and 
international security. It described a new criterion for state conduct 
for potential international enforcement, using any means available 
in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter (including use of force). 
 
c. Invoking the “responsibility to protect.” Ten years after the U.N. 
created the R2P concept, the U.N. Security Council agreed to invoke 
it for the first time in Libya in 2011. Observing the Libyan 
government’s violent response to a popular revolution, the U.N. 
Security Council was careful not to intervene to support efforts to 
 
 77. Id. ¶ 2.21. 
 78. Id. ¶ 2.15. 
 79. Id. ¶¶ 2.21, 2.29. 
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overthrow the government, but it did authorize the use of  
force to protect the civilian population from state violence.  
U.N. SC Resolution 1973 outlined the Security Council’s  
main considerations: 
Reiterating the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the 
Libyan population and reaffirming that parties to armed conflicts 
bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure 
the protection of civilians . . . 
[And e]xpressing its determination to ensure the protection of 
civilians . . . [a]nd unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance 
and the safety of humanitarian personnel . . . .80 
The resolution authorized Member States “[t]o take all necessary 
measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian populated areas 
under threat of attack.”81 
The practical results of the authorized limited intervention in 
Libya were mixed. When the prospect came up again in the Syrian 
conflict, ongoing since 2011, efforts to invoke R2P were muted. This 
was partly due to opposition by Russia and China, who vetoed no 
fewer than twelve U.N. Security Council resolutions between 2011 
and 2019.82 But there was reticence in U.S. foreign policy circles, too. 
Just as with the League of Nations and the International Relief 
Union, members of the Senate did not want any precedent 
compelling intervention; they wanted to maintain discretion to 
exercise the foreign policy option.83 The ICISS report itself, though, 
had already addressed this concern by framing R2P as a binding 
responsibility on a state for its own internal affairs, potentially 
justifying a determination of a “right to intervene”—not a 
responsibility of the international community. Still, the ultimate 
takeaway is that R2P can be invoked. In the case of Libya, the 
 
 80. S.C. Res. 1973 (Mar. 17, 2011) (emphasis added). 
 81. Id. ¶ 4 (emphasis added). 
 82. Yasmine Nahlawi, Overcoming Russian and Chinese Vetoes on Syria Through Uniting 
for Peace, 24 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 111, 123 (2019). 
 83. Mark Landler, U.S. Urged to Adopt Policy Justifying Intervention, N.Y. TIMES  
(July 23, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/24/us/politics/us-urged-to-adopt-
policy-justifying-intervention.html (“To some critics, particularly on the right, R2P smacks 
of a multilateral approach to foreign policy that encroaches on American sovereignty. An 
aide to [Senator] Corker, for example, said he wanted to make sure that . . . the United States 
should only decide to act militarily based on its own national interests.”). 
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international community showed it can choose to hold a country to 
this standard.   
Besides U.N. Security Council deliberations, there has been at 
least one other binding statement of concrete actions a state must 
take as part of its R2P regarding its own people: a regional 
agreement, the African Union’s 2009 Convention for the Protection 
and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala 
Convention).84 In multiple places, the agreement binds African 
Union countries to facilitate humanitarian assistance within their 
own borders and even requires them to request it. Article III(1)(j) 
binds State Parties to “[e]nsure assistance to internally displaced 
persons by meeting their basic needs as well as allowing and 
facilitating rapid and unimpeded access by humanitarian 
organizations and personnel.”85 Article V(6) calls on state parties to 
request humanitarian aid where their own “available resources are 
inadequate.”86 As of 2019, 30 of the 50 Member States of the African 
Union are party to the convention.87 An International Committee of 
the Red Cross ten-year review of the status of implementation 
reports that several state parties have passed domestic legislation 
and engaged in sub-regional and peer-to-peer exchanges, and all of 
the parties jointly agreed to the Harare Plan of Action for the 
Implementation of the Kampala Convention in 2017 and produced 
a model law for domestic implementation in 2018.88 This regional 
agreement shows a way to use domestic commitments to increase 
international engagement. 
States have a responsibility to respect and protect the liberty of 
their people, who in turn can confer legitimacy, and the 
international community has an interest in that state’s fulfillment 
of its responsibilities as a matter of international security. The 
history of sovereignty shows this has always been the norm. 
 
 84. Kampala Convention: African Union Convention for the Protection  
and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, adopted Oct. 23, 2009  
(entered into force Dec. 6, 2012), https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36846-treaty-
kampala_convention.pdf. 
 85. Id. art. III(1)(j). 
 86. Id. art. V(6). 
 87. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, THE KAMPALA CONVENTION: KEY 
RECOMMENDATIONS TEN YEARS ON 5 (Dec. 2019), https://shop.icrc.org/the-kampala-
convention-key-recommendations-ten-years-on-pdf-en. 
 88. Id. at 12, 19, 33. 
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Through the multilateral framework, the international community 
has formally acknowledged this, even if it has not codified it yet. 
 
III. DEVELOPMENT: THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
STATE RESPONSIBILITIES 
Accepting that state legitimacy comes from popular 
sovereignty, and thus should reflect the general will of the people, 
the first necessary condition for a legitimate state is the free will of 
individuals. It is a feedback loop. A state is legitimized by the 
consent of the governed; in order to give that consent, the governed 
must be able to exercise free will. Their ability to develop that free 
will depends on the circumstances that surround them, including 
the security and services provided by the state. 
The concept of “development” itself has evolved over time. 
Early on, it was a civilizational project, then a state project,  
and now since the 1945 U.N. Charter, increasingly a human rights 
concept, with implications for the responsibilities of states to their 
own people and to other states. The consistent through line has 
been its focus on cultivation of the individual. U.N. declarations 
and covenants point toward a global consensus on the constituent 
parts of that cultivation: they include civil, political, economic, 
social, and cultural rights. There is no consensus on what parts— 
or to what extent—the state and the international community are 
responsible for. 
The history of the “development” endeavor indicates that  
it is best understood as a human right for which the state is 
necessarily responsible. The state is responsible to its people to help 
ensure and cultivate their exercise of free will, and it is responsible 
to the international community as part of its responsibility  
to protect. To the extent there is a human “right to development” 
and a “responsibility to protect,” there is a state “responsibility 
to develop.” 
A. Liberty: Cultivating and Exercising Individual Free Will 
It is not a coincidence that the first proponents of development 
and leaders of the anti-slavery movement were religious 
missionaries. The anti-slavery movement is often referred to as the 
first human rights campaign, but the history of state sovereignty 
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shows a cause that predates it: freedom of thought in service of 
religion itself. 
For all of the innovations of the Enlightenment era, including 
the Westphalian state and popular sovereignty, the idea of 
individual free will was a longstanding necessary prerequisite. 
Around AD 395, St. Augustine asserted in his treatise On the Free 
Choice of the Will that man has free will, and thus has the personal 
responsibility to choose between good and evil. He wrote, 
If a person is something good and could act rightly only 
because he willed to, then he ought to have free will, without 
which he could not act rightly. We should not believe that, 
because a person also sins through it, God gave it to him for this 
purpose. The fact that a person cannot live rightly without it  
is therefore a sufficient reason why it should have been given 
to him.  
Free will can also be understood to be given for this reason: 
If anyone uses it in order to sin, the divinity redresses him [for it]. 
This would happen unjustly if free will had been given not only 
for living rightly but also for sinning. How would God justly 
redress someone who made use of his will for the purpose for 
which it was given?89 
This responsibility to choose to be good—to choose and follow 
a religion as a matter of free will—informs the liberty of conscience 
that the Treaty of Westphalia provided in 1648. The direct 
connection was acknowledged by Enlightenment-era thinkers. 
Hegel, for example, observed, 
It was first the Germanic peoples, through Christianity, who 
came to the awareness that every human is free by virtue of being 
human, and that the freedom of spirit comprises our most human 
nature. This awareness arose first in religion, in the innermost 
region of Spirit. But to introduce this principle into worldly reality 
as well: that was a further task, requiring long effort and 
civilization to bring it into being . . . .  
This application of the principle of freedom to worldly 
reality—the dissemination of this principle so that it permeates 
 
 89. AUGUSTINE, ON THE FREE CHOICE OF THE WILL, ON GRACE AND FREE CHOICE, AND 
OTHER WRITINGS 31 (Peter King ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2010), 
https://philonew.files.wordpress.com/2016/08/augustine-augustine-on-the-free-choice-
of-the-will-on-grace-and-free-choice-and-other-writings-2010.pdf. 
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the worldly situation—this is the long process that makes up 
history itself.90 
Development was a civilization-level collaboration among 
individuals to help each of them increase their ability to exercise 
their own free will. In his history of the term “civilization,” Brett 
Bowden summarized Hegel’s logic well: 
In order to comprehend Hegel’s “Idea of Freedom” and its 
realization in and through the state, it is necessary to have a 
general understanding of his theory of the state, for they go hand-
in-hand. . . . For Hegel, a person is free only to the extent that she 
or he is a rational self-determining individual with the ability to 
think and apply the powers of reason. As mere individuals, 
however, human beings are incapable of ever being truly free or 
fulfilling their rationality without the rational state. For it is only 
in the state that true freedom can be actualized, whereby “right 
and duty coalesce, and by being in the ethical order a man has 
rights in so far as he has duties, and duties in so far as he 
has rights.”91   
The purpose of a state, as Hegel conceptualizes it, is to facilitate 
the realization of individual freedom, which in turn legitimizes the 
state: individuals exercising their individual liberty cooperate to 
create the general will of the people, which can confer popular 
sovereignty on the state. A state that does not have individuals 
exercising their freedom to consent to their government, then,  
has no legitimate sovereignty. This rationale helped justify  
colonial empire—the mission of “civilizing” peoples outside of 
their countries’ borders while acting as trustees over those 
foreign territories. 
It also informed evangelical missionaries like William Carey. 
He advocated for education and institution-building around the 
world to help potential converts comprehend and choose to accept 
their religious preaching. His 1792 Enquiry into the Obligations of 
Christians to Use Means for the Conversion of the Heathens was of its 
time in its tone and description of non-Europeans, but it advocated 
 
 90. G.W.F. HEGEL, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 21 (Leo Rauch 
trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1988) (1840). 
 91. BRETT BOWDEN, THE EMPIRE OF CIVILIZATION: THE EVOLUTION OF AN IMPERIAL 
IDEA 68–69 (2009) (quoting G.W.F HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 109 (1820)). 
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against slavery and encouraged evangelical outreach as a 
“civilizing” mission. He wrote, 
After all, the uncivilized state of the heathen, instead of 
affording an objection against preaching the gospel to them, ought 
to furnish an argument for it. Can we as men, or as [C]hristians, 
hear that a great part of our fellow creatures, whose souls are as 
immortal as ours, and who are as capable as ourselves, of 
adorning the gospel, and contributing by their preaching, 
writings, or practices to the glory of our Redeemer’s name, and 
the good of his church, are [e]nveloped in ignorance and 
barbarism? Can we hear that they are without the gospel, without 
government, without laws, and without arts, and sciences; and 
not exert ourselves to introduce amongst them the sentiments of 
men, and of Christians? Would not the spread of the gospel be the 
most effectual mean of their civilization? Would not that make 
them useful members of society?92 
This view that the role of government is to facilitate the 
individual liberty was also fundamental to the abolition of slavery; 
it was antithetical to an idea of a state that enforces human 
bondage. Hence, in a landmark decision for the global anti-slavery 
campaign, a British court declined to enforce ownership rights of 
an American slaveowner who visited with his slave, James 
Somerset, in 1772. (The decision applied only to British territory; it 
did not apply to any of its colonies.) The Court held that, absent any 
“positive law” expressly authorizing slavery, the natural law 
respecting individual liberty in England could not enforce slavery: 
So high an act of dominion must be recognized by the law of the 
country where [slavery] is used. The power of a master over his 
slave has been extremely different, in different countries. The state 
of slavery is of such a nature, that it is incapable of being 
introduced on any reasons, moral or political; but only positive 
law, which preserves its force long after the reasons, occasion, and 
time itself from whence it was created, is erased from memory: 
it’s so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it but 
positive law. Whatever inconveniences, therefore, may follow 
from a decision, I cannot say this case is allowed or approved by 
 
 92. WILLIAM CAREY, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE OBLIGATIONS OF CHRISTIANS TO USE MEANS 
FOR THE CONVERSION OF THE HEATHENS 69–70 (1792), https://www.wmcarey.edu/carey/ 
enquiry/anenquiry.pdf; see also MICHAEL BARNETT, EMPIRE OF HUMANITY: A HISTORY OF 
HUMANITARIANISM 64 (2011). 
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the law of England; and therefore the black [sic] must 
be discharged.93 
The fundamental role—the responsibility—of a legitimate state, 
in this conception, was to facilitate and secure individual liberty. In 
other words, the decision framed development as freedom: a 
longstanding foundation of the concept, as Amartya Sen put it 1,600 
years after St. Augustine.94 
B. Evolving Expectations of the State at Home: Social Services and 
Safety Nets 
1. Framing expectations of the state 
As the Enlightenment era transitioned to the Industrial 
Revolution and individuals became factors of economic 
production, public thinkers, bureaucrats, tradespeople, and factory 
workers began to raise the question of the state’s role in insuring 
against poverty and other widespread, common constraints on 
individual liberty. They articulated that role as what are now 
referred to as social rights. 
In 1776, the same year the United States declared independence, 
Adam Smith made the economic and political argument that, in 
addition to security and safety, the state has an interest in providing 
public infrastructure and public education—and even favorably 
mentioned public health in the process. Though invariably 
associated with the idea of the “invisible hand,” whereby 
individual creativity and an unfettered free market will drive 
economic growth, he actually also advocated for a role for the state 
in cultivating its citizens to help improve economic productivity 
and to promote good governance and legitimate government. He 
wrote in his treatise, The Wealth of Nations: 
For a very small expense the public can facilitate, can encourage, 
and can even impose upon almost the whole body of the people 
the necessity of acquiring those most essential parts of 
education . . . . 
. . . . 
 
 93. Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 510 (K.B. 1772); see also JENNY S. MARTINEZ, 
THE SLAVE TRADE AND THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 20 (2012). 
 94. See generally AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999). 
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[T]o prevent [ignorance] . . .  from spreading . . . through the great 
body of the people, would still deserve the most serious attention 
of government, in the same manner as it would deserve its most 
serious attention to prevent a leprosy or any other loathsome and 
offensive disease . . . from spreading itself among them . . . . 
A man without the proper use of the intellectual faculties of a 
man . . . seems to be mutilated and deformed in a still more 
essential part of the character of human nature . . . .  
The state, however, derives no inconsiderable advantage from 
their instruction. The more they are instructed the less liable they 
are to the delusions of enthusiasm and superstition, which, 
among ignorant nations, frequently occasion the most dreadful 
disorders. An instructed and intelligent people, besides, are 
always more decent and orderly than an ignorant and stupid 
one . . . . They are more disposed to examine, and more capable of 
seeing through, the interested complaints of faction and sedition, 
and they are, upon that account, less apt to be misled into any 
wanton or unnecessary opposition to the measures of 
government. In free countries, where the safety of government 
depends very much upon the favourable judgment which the 
people may form of its conduct, it must surely be of the highest 
importance that they should not be disposed to judge rashly or 
capriciously concerning it.95 
So, the state has an interest in providing at least a certain level 
of education to help make better informed, more reasonable, more 
productive citizens. 
Similarly, Thomas Paine, author of the influential pamphlet 
Common Sense, which advocated for American independence from 
Britain in 1776, also described the rights of man that should be 
expected in a state whose government is based on popular 
sovereignty. In his 1791 essay, Rights of Man, he defended the 
French Revolution as an action by the people to legitimize their 
government96 and advocated for more political rights (voting 
rights) for more citizens (beyond landowners) to help entrench 
legitimate government.97 Paine asserted that the social compact 
between the state and the people in a democratically legitimate 
 
 95. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 1044, 1048–49 (Elec. Book Co. 2001) (1776). 
 96. THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN: BEING AN ANSWER TO MR. BURKE’S ATTACK 
ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (Floating Press 2010) (1791). 
 97. Id. at 85–86. 
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government is an ongoing negotiation based on protection  
and cultivation of certain rights.98 Echoing the Enlightenment era 
consensus that “man” has a natural right to liberty, he asserted  
that the only reason people would enter into a social compact and 
consent to be governed as a group is to secure and cultivate 
that liberty: 
Man did not enter into society to become worse than he was 
before, nor to have fewer rights than he had before, but to have 
those rights better secured. His natural rights are the foundation 
of all his civil rights . . . . 
Natural rights are those which appertain to man in right of his 
existence. Of this kind are all the intellectual rights, or rights of 
the mind [(including freedom of thought, which includes freedom 
of religion)], and also all those rights of acting as an individual for 
his own comfort and happiness, which are not injurious to the 
natural rights of others. Civil rights are those which appertain to 
man in right of his being a member of society. Every civil right has 
for its foundation some natural right pre-existing in the 
individual, but to the enjoyment of which his individual power is 
not, in all cases, sufficiently competent. Of this kind are all those 
which relate to security and protection.99 
Accordingly, Paine concludes, the state has affirmative duties 
to the people in service of their liberty: 
Whatever the form or constitution of government may be, it 
ought to have no other object than the general happiness. When, 
instead of this, it operates to create and increase wretchedness in 
any of the parts of society, it is on a wrong system . . . . 
. . . . 
When, in countries that are called civili[z]ed, we see age going to 
the workhouse and youth to the gallows, something must be 
 
 98. Id. at 34, 37. On the constant negotiation of government, he wrote particularly 
colorfully, “A greater absurdity cannot present itself to the understanding of man . . . [to say] 
that a certain body of men who existed a hundred years ago made a law, and that there does 
not exist in the nation, nor ever will, nor ever can, a power to alter it . . . . The [British] 
Parliament of 1688 might as well have passed an act to have authorized themselves to live 
for ever [sic], as to make their authority live for ever [sic]. All, therefore, that can be said of 
those clauses is that they are a formality of words, of as much import as if those who used 
them had addressed a congratulation to themselves, and in the oriental style of antiquity had 
said: O Parliament, live for ever [sic]!” Id. 
 99. Id. at 75–76. 
3.KHARDORI_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)  3/28/2021  1:00 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:4 (2021) 
1062 
 
wrong in the system of government. . . . [T]here lies hidden from 
the eye of common observation, a mass of wretchedness, that has 
scarcely any other chance, than to expire in poverty or infamy. Its 
entrance into life is marked with the presage of its fate; and until 
this is remedied, it is in vain to punish. 
Civil government does not exist in executions; but in making 
such provision for the instruction of youth and the support of age, 
as to exclude, as much as possible, profligacy from the one and 
despair from the other.100 
From this, he outlined several social protections a state should 
be expected to provide, including anti-poverty protections, like old 
age and disability pensions; economic rights, including freedom of 
labor (e.g., to negotiate fair compensation); and political rights and 
social services necessary for them, including universal suffrage and 
public education.  On the importance of the link between education 
and political rights and state legitimacy, he emphasized, “A nation 
under a well-regulated government should permit none to remain 
uninstructed. It is monarchical and aristocratical government only 
that requires ignorance for its support.”101 
For reasons similar to those cited by Smith and Paine, Thomas 
Jefferson advocated for public education of citizens in America, 
sponsoring multiple bills in his home state, Virginia, including the 
1779 Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge and the 1817 
Bill for Establishing a System of Public Education. He described 
America’s new republican form of government as “a government 
by its citizens in mass, acting directly and personally according to 
rules established by the majority,” and he described education of 
the citizens as necessary to “facilitate the people’s ‘good sense’ on 
which ‘we may rely with the most security for the preservation of 
a due degree of liberty.’”102 
So, even at the foundation of the modern liberal state, the 
thinkers and framers who shaped it understood that the state has 
responsibilities to provide certain services to facilitate the exercise 
of individual liberty. 
 
 100. Id. at 305, 316–17. 
 101. Id. at 356. 
 102. James Carpenter, Thomas Jefferson and the Ideology of Democratic Schooling, 
21 DEMOCRACY & EDUC. 1, 3 (2013) (quoting XV THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 19, 918 
(A.A. Lipscomb & A.E. Bergh eds., 1903)). 
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2. Implementing expectations of the state 
The Industrial Revolution over the first half of the 1800s 
changed social and economic relationships among people and 
between people and the state.103 As more people combined their 
labor and cities grew around factories, and economic growth in the 
state came to rely on “labor” as an economic and social class, states 
and the people increasingly recognized a role for the state in 
providing certain social goods or benefits to ensure their general 
well-being. To be clear, this was a very minimal level of “well-
being”; it is more accurate to describe the social protections of the 
era as safety nets against abject destitution. Still, it established the 
concept of social rights.104 
The elements of social rights and economic protections rose in 
Europe, the United States, and throughout the world pursuant to 
industrialization and the creation of non-partisan administrative 
state bureaucracies that were perceived by the public as capable of 
administering social benefits without political or personal bias.105 
States began to provide these services and protections for multiple 
reasons, including domestic stability (responding to or preempting 
unrest from laborers, a growing social class), recognizing  
healthy labor as needed economic inputs, and as a political 
consequence of the evolving social compact.106 As Stein Kuhnle and 
Anne Sander summarized, 
The experience of industrialization sustainably altered the 
debate on the nature of social contingency and perceptions of 
poverty. Old age or sickness had of course been perceived as a 
threat to the well-being of individuals from time immemorial. 
Now, however, a new-found understanding of unemployment 
and of the operation of the business cycle made for a rethinking 
 
 103. See KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 77 (Beacon Press 1957) (1944). 
 104. Technically, state acts of welfare could be traced back to the British Elizabethan 
Act for the Relief of the Poor in 1601 and similar state acts through the Prussian Landrecht of 
1794, but these were acts of charity of a monarch that supported local initiatives. See Stein 
Kuhnle & Anne Sander, The Emergence of the Western Welfare State, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF THE WELFARE STATE 61, 62–63 (Francis G. Castles, Stephan Leibfried, Jane Lewis, Herbert 
Obinger & Christopher Pierson eds., 2010). 
 105. See Ann Shola Orloff & Theda Skocpol, Why Not Equal Protection? Explaining the 
Politics of Public Social Spending in Britain, 1900–1911, and the United States, 1880s–1920, 49 AM. 
SOCIO. REV. 726, 726–50, 740–42 (1984). 
 106. Kuhnle & Sander, supra note 104, at 64–65. 
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of the whole notion of welfare, with the focus changing to 
provisions that addressed the most significant social deficits with 
the most evident social consequences. The evolving ‘social 
question’ accompanying industrialization served as an important 
spur for the crystallization of the notion of social rights, as 
workers started to perceive themselves as one class and as the 
labor movement gained increasing importance. Focusing on the 
question of how economic progress could be secured in face of the 
political and moral threat imposed by the condition of the 
working class, the solution was increasingly seen as some kind of 
state action. Prior decades had seen the spread of democracy and 
political rights. Directly or indirectly, these now smoothed the 
way for social rights.107 
The nineteenth century saw a wide range of domestic social 
legislation, including social insurance, as well as labor standards 
and protections, public health, and public health measures.108 The 
British Factory Act of 1802 limited workday hours to some extent 
and required factory owners to provide a minimal level of literacy 
to “apprentices” (i.e., child laborers), which was progress for its 
time. In 1834, Britain’s first “New Poor Law” recognized a state 
responsibility to provide a very minimal economic safety net, a sort 
of limited economic security.109 Notably, just three years following 
that acknowledgment, Britain provided famine relief to its colonial 
subjects in India for the first time—extending the logic of this first 
acknowledgment of an economic responsibility to the people under 
the state’s dominion.110 From the beginning of the Industrial 
Revolution through the end of World War I in 1918, thirty-two 
countries in the world had established some sort of social insurance 
or compensation benefit for workplace injuries, eighteen countries 
had some form of public healthcare benefit or insurance, and 
thirteen had old-age disability or survivor’s benefits.111 
The United States lagged behind most Western states in 
providing what are now considered social rights. Scholars Theda 
Skocpol and Ann Orloff attribute this to the United States being 
relatively late to establish a non-partisan civil service that could be 
 
 107. Id. at 63. 
 108. Id. at 64–65. 
 109. BARNETT, supra note 92, at 63. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Kuhnle & Stander, supra note 104, at 69–70. 
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trusted to administer social services fairly.112 Until the Civil Service 
Act of 1883, the U.S. federal bureaucracy was staffed under a 
“spoils” system, whereby most positions were filled by appointees 
of each new President, and they invariably favored short-term 
patronage over long-term benefits.113 In the United States, race was 
apparently less of a domestic factor in delaying a general benefit 
than it would be on the international level (see discussions herein 
on the League of Nations and U.N. human rights negotiations) 
because, whatever benefits were provided domestically (dating 
back to Civil War pensions) could—and did—simply exclude 
non-white people until the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited 
such distinctions.114 
Overall, worldwide social insurance and social security policies 
were an evolutionary step forward for the state. Security and 
stability of the state became more than just questions of foreign 
intrusion and domestic violence; it now recognized human 
security, which itself expanded beyond the merely physical to 
include economic and social aspects.115 Not coincidentally, this 
rationale would be echoed another century later in the 1990s 
discussions on failed states and responsibility to protect. 
C. Expanding Statehood: Trusteeship Abroad 
1. Defining “civilization” 
While negotiating domestic responsibilities of a state, the 
European Great Powers were able to dictate expectations for 
peoples and potential states abroad in their colonies. Speaking from 
his experience as a British colonial officer in India, J.S. Mill wrote in 
his 1836 essay, Civilization, that the term “is a word of double 
meaning . . . [including] human improvement in general, and 
sometimes . . . certain kinds of improvement in particular.”116 He 
further described the “ingredients of civilization”: 
 
 112. See Orloff & Skocpol, supra note 105, at 739. 
 113. See id. at 731; U.S. OFF. OF PERS. MGMT., BIOGRAPHY OF AN IDEAL: A HISTORY OF THE 
FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE 9 (2012). 
 114. See Orloff & Skocpol, supra note 105, at 729. 
 115. Kuhnle & Stander, supra note 104, at 64. 
 116. JOHN STUART MILL, CIVILIZATION, reprinted in ESSAYS ON POLITICS AND CULTURE 51 
(Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Doubleday 1962) (1836) (emphasis in original). 
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[A] savage tribe consists of a handful of individuals, wandering 
or thinly scattered over a vast tract of country: a dense population, 
therefore, dwelling in fixed habitations, and largely collected 
together in towns and villages, we term civilized. In savage life 
there is no commerce, no manufacture, no agriculture, or next to 
none; a country in the fruits of agriculture, commerce, and 
manufactures, we call civilized. In savage communities each 
person shifts for himself; except in war (and even then very 
imperfectly) we seldom see any joint operations carried on by the 
union of many; nor do savages find much pleasure in each other’s 
society. Wherever, therefore, we find human beings acting 
together for common purposes in large bodies, and enjoying the 
pleasures of social intercourse, we term them civilized.117 
Many Enlightenment-era thinkers articulated individual 
freedom as a purpose of the state. Some also rationalized that 
individual freedom must be expanded to all states as a matter of 
international security: truly democratic states would be highly 
disinclined to go to war with each other. Bowden summarizes 
Immanuel Kant on this point: Kant’s Idea for a Universal History 
described the individual’s “highest purpose of Nature” as 
“realizable only in a ‘society with the greatest freedom’ under a 
‘perfectly just civic constitution’”—the individual needs the 
institutions of the state, administered objectively, to help them most 
fully realize their individual freedom. 118 In turn, in such an ideal-
type state with a representative government, the represented 
individuals would be unlikely to exercise their free will to commit 
themselves to war. Per Bowden, Kant 
affirms that the “republican constitution, besides the purity of its 
origin . . . also gives a favorable prospect for the desired 
consequence, i.e., perpetual peace.” The “reason is this: if the 
consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war 
should be declared (and in this constitution it cannot but be the 
case), nothing is more natural than that they would be very 
 
 117. Id. at 52. 
 118. BOWDEN, supra note 91, at 84–85 (citing IMMANUEL KANT, IDEA FOR A UNIVERSAL 
HISTORY FROM A COSMOPOLITAN POINT OF VIEW, reprinted in KANT: ON HISTORY 11, 16 (Lewis 
White Beck ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1963) (1784); PERPETUAL PEACE, reprinted in KANT: ON HISTORY 
85, 93–95 (1798)). 
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cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing themselves 
all the calamities of war.119 
The consent of free, “civilized” citizens to their government 
helps to ensure domestic stability of the state. States beholden to 
that consent help ensure international security. Hence, national 
interest becomes a basis for exporting the elements for Westphalian 
governance—including as a justification for colonialism (framed 
independently of the more prosaic economic extraction motive).   
The 1885 Berlin Conference among European powers settled the 
“scramble for Africa,” dividing African territories for their respective 
colonial control. The Treaty of Berlin (also referred to as the General 
Act) outlined a trustee-type relationship. Article 6 stated, 
All the Powers exercising sovereign rights or influence in the 
aforesaid territories bind themselves to watch over the preservation 
of the native tribes, and to care for the improvement of the conditions of 
their moral and material well-being, and to help in suppressing 
slavery, and especially the slave trade. They shall, without 
distinction of creed or nation, protect and favour all religious, 
scientific or charitable institutions and undertakings created and 
organized for the above ends, or which aim at instructing the 
natives and bringing home to them the blessings of civilization.120 
They implicitly acknowledged that they did not have 
legitimacy in the form of consent of the governed, but they justified 
their dominion by rationalizing that the people lacked the ability to 
provide that consent. Their relationship was paternalistic; they 
created and took on a state responsibility to develop the territory 
and people to “bring[] home to them the blessings of 
civilization.”121 This, as Rudyard Kipling infamously described  
in advocating for the United States to provide development 
assistance to the Philippines after gaining control over it in the 
Spanish-American War in 1898, was “the white man’s burden.”122 
The emerging consensus standard of civilization among 
European states and thinkers was a state that represents the will of 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. General Act of the Berlin Conference on West Africa art. 6, Feb. 26, 1885 
(emphasis added). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Rudyard Kipling, The White Man’s Burden: The United States and The Philippine 
Islands, MCCLURE’S MAG., Feb. 1899, at 12. 
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the people of its territory in international relations externally and 
protects the private life, liberty, and property of individuals 
regardless of nationality internally.123 
That standard is still very relevant today; it informs the 
international community’s general end-goal for a “developing” 
country: a government whose legitimacy is based on popular 
sovereignty (which implicates civil and political rights), exercised 
without bias (rule of law and civil rights), and committed to 
protecting property (economic rights) and respecting—and 
necessarily cultivating—liberty (social and cultural rights—e.g., 
especially, religion).   
2. Acknowledging self-determination . . . at some indeterminate 
future point 
After Berlin, the next international agreement to address 
colonies was more specific: the Charter of the League of Nations in 
1919 established the Mandates system in the wake of World War I, 
reframing colonial rule as a transitional authority. Article 22 of the 
Charter stated, 
To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of 
the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States 
which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by 
peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous 
conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the 
principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a 
sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of 
this trust should be embodied in this Covenant. 
The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the 
tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by 
reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position 
can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, 
and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories 
on behalf of the League.124 
The “well-being and development” of the people became a 
“sacred trust” of the occupying authority.125 It also begged the 
question: Would that not also be the case for a legitimate 
 
 123. BOWDEN, supra note 91, at 123. 
 124. League of Nations Covenant art. 22 (emphasis added). 
 125. Id. 
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government? Article 23 laid out the elements of this governing 
stewardship, including responsibilities to 
endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions 
of labor . . . ; 
undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants . . . ; 
make provision to secure and maintain freedom of 
communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the 
commerce of all Members of the League[; and] 
endeavour to take steps in matters of international concern for the 
prevention and control of disease.126 
The affected former colonial territories were divided into three 
classes within the League’s Mandate system, based on perceptions 
of their level of “civilization” or “development.”127 From Class A, 
the French Mandate for Syria and Lebanon included terms such as 
Article 1, directing the governing Mandatory to “facilitate the 
progressive development of Syria and the Lebanon as independent 
States”; Article 6 to “establish . . . a judicial system which shall 
assure to natives as well as to foreigners a complete guarantee of 
their rights”; and Article 8 guaranteeing “the free exercise of all 
forms of worship” and “encourag[ing] public instruction.”128 Class 
A and Class B mandates also included clauses on the security of all 
people and property (for nationals of any member of the League) 
and free trade. From Class C, Australia’s mandate in New Guinea 
did not mention improvement of “the natives,” but Section 15  
did outlaw slavery and commit to “free exercise of all forms 
of worship.”129 
At the outset of the negotiations for the Charter, U.S. President 
Woodrow Wilson asserted an ideal of universal self-determination 
in his “Fourteen Points” speech: 
What we demand . . . is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the 
world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be 
 
 126. Id. art. 23. 
 127. Denys P. Myers, The Mandate System of the League of Nations, 96 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 74 (1921). 
 128. COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, French Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon, 3 
LEAGUE NATIONS OFF. J. 1013, 1013–14 (1922). 
 129. New Guinea Act 1920 (Cth) (Austl.) (codifying terms of the Australian Mandate for 
New Guinea). 
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made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, 
wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be 
assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the 
world as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of 
the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own 
part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will 
not be done to us.130 
The Charter itself was significantly less emphatic. Indeed, a 
Japanese proposal to include a statement on racial equality in the 
Charter was rejected due to concerns of the American and Great 
Powers representatives over implications for their domestic 
governance.131 But it did contemplate self-determination for the 
Class A Mandates, describing “the rendering of administrative 
advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are 
able to stand alone.”132 The trustee governments were expected to 
provide basic state administration, including labor and commerce 
regulation and infrastructure, and fair administration of justice. 
Though the United States ultimately did not ratify the Charter, it 
had taken on for itself similar responsibilities in the territories it had 
gained control of in the Spanish-American War of 1898. It also 
provided public health interventions, with sanitation and yellow 
 
 130. Woodrow Wilson, President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, AVALON PROJECT 
(Jan. 8, 1918), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp. In response to the 
advocacy for self-determination, W.E.B. Du Bois and other leaders of the NAACP traveled 
to the Paris negotiations in hopes of petitioning for self-determination for black people. The 
group deliberately mirrored the fourteen-point speech in presenting a nine-point 
declaration. Point 8 used the “civilization” rhetoric, as well: “Civilized Negroes: Wherever 
persons of African descent are civilized and able to meet the tests of surrounding culture, 
they shall be accorded the same rights as their fellow citizens; they shall not be denied on 
account of race or color a voice in their own government, justice before the courts and 
economic and social equality according to ability and desert.” See Arnulf Becker Lorca, 
Petitioning the International: A ‘Pre-history’ of Self-determination, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 497, 500 
(2014). Their petition was not successful, and the final Charter took a more limited approach 
to self-determination. Id. 
 131. Mark Mazower, The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933–1950, 47 HIST. J. 379, 
382 (2004) (“A Japanese proposal that the League commit itself to racial equality was 
unceremoniously and improperly blocked by the major Powers, despite the support it had 
attracted from other states. . . . So far as Whitehall [(a colloquialism for the British 
government)] was concerned, the League was not going to be allowed to pontificate about 
racial segregation in the USA, nor about the English treatment of Catholics or Chinese in 
Liverpool.”); Seth Mohney, The Great Power Origins of Human Rights, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 827, 
833 (2014). 
 132. League of Nations Covenant art. 22. 
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fever eradication campaigns in the Philippines and Cuba, which 
benefited American security and economic interests.133 
D. The United Nations Charter: Transition to Human 
Rights-Based Obligations 
1. Post-war: The New Deal at home and abroad 
During World War II, U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
contended with domestic responsibilities of the state at home, 
which influenced his proposals that significantly shaped the United 
Nations Charter in 1945 and the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights 
in 1948. 
Having become president in the midst of the Great Depression, 
Roosevelt initially focused on establishing economic and social 
safety nets at home. He worked with Congress to pass the Social 
Security Act of 1935. As a bill, it also briefly mentioned health, but 
according to an authoritative account, it was “struck out . . . because 
of objections by Southern political leaders that the federal 
government might use such phrases to force their states to pay 
higher pensions to blacks than they thought desirable.”134 Still, it 
established America’s minimal social safety net. Roosevelt’s 1941 
State of the Union address, which became known as the Four 
Freedoms speech, identified domestic economic and social conditions 
as causes of state instability and, consequently, threats to 
international security, and proposed state intervention accordingly: 
Certainly this is no time for any of us to stop thinking about 
the social and economic problems which are the root cause of the social 
revolution which is today a supreme factor in the world. For there is 
nothing mysterious about the foundations of a healthy and strong 
democracy. The basic things expected by our people of their political 
and economic systems are simple. They are: Equality of opportunity 
for youth and for others. Jobs for those who can work. Security for 
those who need it. The ending of special privilege for the few. The 
preservation of civil liberties for all. The enjoyment of the fruits of 
scientific progress in a wider and constantly rising standard 
of living. 
 
 133. See RANDALL M. PACKARD, A HISTORY OF GLOBAL HEALTH: INTERVENTIONS INTO 
THE LIVES OF OTHER PEOPLES 17–19, 28–31 (2016). 
 134. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 269 (2017). 
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. . . . 
In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look 
forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms.  
The first is freedom of speech and expression—everywhere in 
the world.  
The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his 
own way—everywhere in the world.  
The third is freedom from want—which, translated into 
world terms, means economic understandings which will secure 
to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants—
everywhere in the world.135 
In 1945, he would further propose a “Second Bill of Rights” to 
guarantee economic rights within the United States. He framed it 
as a matter of individual liberty: 
We have come to a clear realization of the fact that true 
individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and 
independence. . . . In our day these economic truths have become 
accepted as self-evident. We have accepted, so to speak, a second 
Bill of Rights under which a new basis of security and prosperity 
can be established for all—regardless of station, race, or creed.136 
He listed nine specific rights in the speech, including a right to 
employment, a right to a living wage (“enough to provide adequate 
food and clothing and recreation”) adequate medical care “and the 
opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health,” social security 
(“adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness, 
accident, and unemployment”), and education.137 These did not 
become binding domestic U.S. rights—arguably for uniquely 
 
 135. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Transcript of President Franklin Roosevelt’s Annual 
Message (Four Freedoms) to Congress (1941), OUR DOCUMENTS (emphasis added), 
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=70&page=transcript  
(last visited Jan. 29, 2021). 
 136. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, State of the Union Message to Congress, FRANKLIN D. 
ROOSEVELT PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM (Jan. 11, 1944), http://www.fdrlibrary. 
marist.edu/archives/address_text.html. For further discussion on Roosevelt’s speech,  
see Cass R. Sunstein & Randy E. Barnett, Constitutive Commitments and Roosevelt’s Second Bill 
of Rights: A Dialogue, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 205, 207 (2005). 
 137. Roosevelt, supra note 136. 
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domestic U.S. reasons138—but they greatly influenced human rights 
commitments elsewhere. 
And he was not alone. As Europe faced reconstruction after 
World War II, Sir William Beveridge submitted his report, Social 
Insurance and Allied Services, frequently cited as a foundational 
document of the modern welfare state, to the government of the 
United Kingdom in 1942.139 This was shortly before the 
international aid effort for the reconstruction of Europe (including 
establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions in 1944 and the 
Marshall Plan speech in 1947). The Beveridge report laid out three 
guiding principles for a comprehensive social safety net: 
The first principle is that any proposals for the future [should 
be comprehensive]. Now, when the war is abolishing landmarks 
of every kind, is the opportunity for using experience in a clear 
field. A revolutionary moment in the world’s history is a time for 
revolutions, not for patching. 
The second principle is that . . . social insurance should be 
treated as one part only of a comprehensive policy of social 
progress. Social insurance fully developed may provide income 
security; it is an attack upon Want. But Want is one only of five 
giants on the road of reconstruction and in some ways the easiest 
to attack. The others are Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness. 
The third principle is that social security must be achieved by 
co-operation between the State and the individual. The State 
should offer security for service and contribution. The State in 
organising security should not stifle incentive, opportunity, 
responsibility; in establishing a national minimum, it should leave 
room and encouragement for voluntary action by each individual 
to provide more than that minimum for himself and his family.140 
The proposed baseline, then, was an economic safety net—a 
minimum economic right of individuals, provided by the state 
 
 138. In particular, race in America. See Alberto Alesina, Edward Glaeser & Bruce 
Sacerdote, Why Doesn’t the United States Have a European-Style Welfare State?, 2 BROOKINGS 
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 187 (2001) (comparing racial compositions and views of poverty 
in America and Western European countries); STARR, supra note 134, at 269 (explaining how 
race was a factor in removing healthcare from the U.S. Social Security Act of 1935). 
 139. WILLIAM BEVERIDGE, SOCIAL INSURANCE AND ALLIED SERVICES 1 (1942), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/19_07_05_beveridge.pdf. 
 140. Id. at 6–7. 
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through compulsory contributions (taxation), and separate 
arrangements for healthcare and education. 
2. The Charter 
The 1945 United Nations Charter itself further developed 
international expectations of a state, while emphasizing domestic 
discretion and expressly precluding international enforcement of 
many of those expectations. In the preparatory negotiations for the 
Charter at Dumbarton Oaks, the Great Powers recognized the need 
to set limits on domestic state conduct that threatened international 
security, but they also sought to ensure that they would not be 
compelled to intervene, and, more urgently, that the new 
international organization could not enforce standards they might 
establish internationally against themselves domestically. 
Even with these caveats, the Chinese delegation caused 
complications when it proposed “that there should be a clear 
overarching commitment to the principle of racial equality, and to 
human rights in general.”141 The American and British delegations, 
joined by the Russians, again expressed concern about domestic 
implications. The latter two opposed reference to human rights at 
all. The American delegation insisted on including human rights, 
but also created insulation against enforcement thereof. As Mark 
Mazower describes, 
President Roosevelt had let it be known privately that he was 
strongly in favour of some reference to human rights. The 
administration felt caught between the Scylla of isolationists, 
anxious to preserve the constitution of the U[nited] S[tates] from 
outside intervention [, and to forestall international pressure on 
domestic U.S. racial policies], and the Charybdis of 
internationalists who were inspired by Roosevelt’s idealistic 
rhetoric and believed the administration should take seriously its 
mission of building a freer world. Hence the Americans proposed 
a formulation which would allow them to have their cake and eat 
it too, posing as defenders of both universal human rights and 
domestic state rights. 
The International Organization should refrain from 
intervention in the internal affairs of any state, it being the 
responsibility of each state to see that conditions prevailing within 
 
 141. Mazower, supra note 131, at 391. 
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its jurisdiction do not endanger international peace and security 
and, to this end, to respect the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of all its people and to govern in accordance with the 
principles of humanity and justice.142 
Thus, Article 2 of the Charter reaffirms the concept of 
sovereignty first established by the League of Nations, stating, “All 
members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state. . . .”143 
Though territorial sovereignty is typically characterized as a 
defensive mechanism for former colonies, it bears noting that the 
Great Powers did not agree to it as a concession to them; they 
insisted on it as insurance against commitments to them—and were 
partly motivated by hopefully outdated views on racial 
discrimination.144 (The U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 were still twenty years away at the time.) 
Elsewhere, the Charter established an international standard—
or, at least, expectation—for domestic governance.145 Article 1(3) set 
out among the United Nation’s purposes “[t]o achieve international 
cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, 
social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all.”146 Article 55 in Chapter IX, on International 
Economic and Social Cooperation, elaborates, 
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and 
well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations 
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal  
rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations 
shall promote: 
higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions 
of economic and social progress and development; 
 
 142. Id. at 391–92 (quoting PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS: VISIONS SEEN (1998)). 
 143. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
 144. Mohney, supra note 131, at 839. 
 145. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7. 
 146. Id. art. 1, ¶ 3. 
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solutions of international economic, social, health, and related 
problems; and international cultural and educational 
cooperation; and 
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, 
sex, language, or religion.147 
Granted, unlike security issues under the purview of  
the Security Council, these expectations for the state have no 
binding enforcement mechanism. Other than asking the Security 
Council to consider security-related implications of an issue,  
the main recourse for the Economic and Social Council is to  
send “recommendations” to an individual member state or the 
General Assembly.148 
3. The trusteeship system 
Along with the aspirational statement on state responsibilities, 
the U.N. Charter also included a Trusteeship Council to continue 
the transition from colonialism started by the League of Nations’ 
Mandate system. Under the U.N. Charter, the trusteeship system  
is arguably the only binding guidance for expectations of a state. 
Chapters XII and XIII established the U.N. Trusteeship System  
and the Trusteeship Council to oversee it. The system was 
effectively limited to the remaining trustee arrangements from  
the League of Nations’ Mandate system, and the Council was 
disbanded in 1994 upon the independence of the final Trust 
territory, though it technically remains available to be recalled by 
the General Assembly.149 
Chapter XII specified expectations of trustees and criteria for 
independence of the trust territories. Article 76 listed “basic 
objectives” of the system, including 
to promote the political, economic, social, and educational 
advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and  
their progressive development towards self-government or 
independence as may be appropriate to the particular 
circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely 
 
 147. Id. art. 55. 
 148. Id. art. 62, ¶ 2. 
 149. Trusteeship Council Res. 2200 (LXI), at 2 (May 25, 1994). 
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expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be 
provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement; 
to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of 
the peoples of the world; and 
to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial 
matters for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals, 
and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of 
justice, without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing 
objectives and subject to the provisions of Article 80.150 
Article 88 required administering trustees to submit annual 
reports on “the political, economic, social, and educational 
advancement of the inhabitants of each trust territory.”151 The 
deliberations for the provisional (template) questionnaire focused 
on infrastructure, education, and social services, including health 
insurance, as well as political rights (and non-discrimination in all 
of these).152 In reality, the trust territories petitioned for and 
ultimately were granted their independence in the absence of 
robust implementation of economic, social, and cultural rights, but 
the marker of expectations was at least there. 
E. Human Rights: Nonbinding and Binding 
1. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
A few years later, the 1948 Universal Declaration of  
Human Rights presented the next evolutionary leap. It was much  
more specific than anything that preceded it, though still  
expressly nonbinding. Eleanor Roosevelt led the U.S. delegation,  
with instructions from the State Department to not agree  
to a binding covenant at the time. For her part, she convincingly 
argued that a nonbinding declaration would be an immediate 
statement and beacon for the world, while avoiding the damaging 
counter-narrative of American rejection—almost certain defeat in a 
U.S. domestic ratification debate with American southern state 
 
 150. U.N. Charter art. 76(b)–(d). 
 151. Id. art. 88. 
 152. U.N. TCOR, 1st Sess., Compilation of Questions in the Formulation of 
Questionnaires: Item 8 of the Provisional Agenda, U.N. Doc. T/9 (Mar. 25, 1947). 
3.KHARDORI_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)  3/28/2021  1:00 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:4 (2021) 
1078 
 
senators.153 She also successfully advocated within the U.S. 
delegation and directly with President Truman to agree to include 
economic, social, and cultural rights in the declaration at all. (She 
directly invoked President Roosevelt’s New Deal and the Four 
Freedoms speech.)154 
The resulting Declaration states in its preamble that it is “a 
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all 
nations.”155 It includes several provisions on civil and political 
rights and liberties: 
Article 18: Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or 
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and 
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, 
practice, worship and observance. 
Article 19: Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without 
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
through any media and regardless of frontiers. 
Article 20: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. 
No one may be compelled to belong to an association. 
Article 21: 
Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, 
directly or through freely chosen representatives. 
Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in 
his country. 
The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; 
this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall 
be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or 
by equivalent free voting procedures.156 
And it includes several provisions on economic, social, and 
cultural rights: 
 
 153. Mohney, supra note 131, at 853–56. 
 154. MICHELIN R. ISHAY, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE 
GLOBALIZATION ERA 222 (2d. ed. 2008). 
 155. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, pmbl. (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 156. Id. arts. 18–21 (emphasis added). 
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Article 3: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security 
of person. 
Article 22: Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social 
security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and 
international co-operation and in accordance with the 
organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and 
cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development 
of his personality. 
Article 23: 
Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment,  
to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection 
against unemployment. 
Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for 
equal work. 
Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration 
ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human 
dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of 
social protection. 
Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the 
protection of his interests. 
Article 25(1): Everyone has the right to a standard of living 
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, 
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social 
services, and the right to security in the event of [personal tragedy] 
beyond his control. 
Article 26: 
1) Everyone has the right to education. . . . 
2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the 
human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. . . .157 
This is all to say, the Declaration spoke at length about several 
rights the state should be responsible for, but expressly did not hold 
them to any of it. Under the circumstances, it was a strategic 
success. It sent a message and established a norm, and the ensuing 
decades would prove Eleanor Roosevelt right: the U.S. Senate 
 
 157. Id. arts. 3, 22–23, 25–26 (emphasis added). 
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rejected attempts at binding human rights commitments even 
decades later. 
2. The International Bill of Rights: Two covenants 
In December 1950, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 421 (V) 
called for the Commission on Human Rights, under the direction 
of the U.N.’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), to draft a 
single, binding “International Covenant on Human Rights,” 
including “provisions rendering it obligatory for States to promote 
the implementation of the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms proclaimed [therein] to take the necessary steps . . . to 
guarantee to everyone the real opportunity of enjoying those rights 
and freedoms.”158 
Almost immediately, that commission recognized the two  
key questions: How exactly would states implement such rights?  
And to what extent would the international community be 
responsible to provide assistance?159 They observed that civil  
and political rights are individual rights against the state; they 
could be legislated, implemented, and enforced within a state 
through courts. But economic, social, and cultural rights would be 
more complicated. 
Daniel Whelan summarized the challenge of economic, social, 
and cultural rights: 
Of significant difficulty for the Commission in 1951—and indeed 
for us today—was determining the scope of obligations and the 
appropriate international institutional mechanisms for the 
protection and promotion of economic, social, and cultural rights. 
Do the obligations rest solely on states-parties, and how strong 
are those obligations? Should international assistance be made 
available to states-parties in order for them to meet their 
obligations? Would states be required to seek assistance from the 
international community to meet their obligations? Would they 
have a right to assistance? What, exactly, would “assistance” 
include? Would Western states, independent of the U.N. and its 
specialized agencies, have obligations to developing states?160 
 
 158. G.A. Res. 421(V) (Dec. 4, 1950). 
 159. DANIEL J. WHELAN, INDIVISIBLE HUMAN RIGHTS: A HISTORY 96 (2010). 
 160. Id. 
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For the newly independent former colonial states, sovereignty 
and protection against foreign intervention without their consent 
was important, but they also saw a role for international assistance 
to help meet their domestic governance responsibilities. For former 
colonial powers and other advanced economies, the primary goal 
was to avoid a binding duty to provide assistance; they preferred 
to maintain discretion to provide assistance—as they had since the 
League of Nations and to this day. In those early 1951 negotiations, 
Yugoslavia proposed a clause on international cooperation, 
whereby “Signatory States whose economic situation was difficult 
would thus be aware that they could rely on help from the 
international community in implementing economic, social and 
cultural rights.”161 India’s representative, Hansa Mehta, added that 
India would agree to a term that expressly established an 
affirmative international responsibility to assist. She even offered a 
framework: India would support such a term 
if the meaning was that when the resources of a State were 
inadequate it would receive international help on certain 
conditions which it would have to accept. . . . It should be for a 
State to declare that its resources are inadequate and to ask the 
United Nations for assistance, which should be granted provided 
the request was justified.162 
This approach was not adopted. From the would-be donor 
government perspective, Mrs. Roosevelt made clear that the United 
States would not support an interpretation that would, as Whelan 
put it, “translate states-parties’ national obligations to progressively 
implement economic, social, and cultural rights through 
international cooperation into interstate obligations—rights-claims 
for development assistance.”163 She also accurately predicted the 
U.S. Senate would not ratify a covenant with economic, social, and 
cultural rights.164 Fellow U.S. representative, John Humphrey, 
supported a system whereby states self-report progress toward 
implementation of economic, social, and cultural rights, which 
donor governments and U.N. agencies would use to guide—but 
not compel—their assistance. While also reaffirming the view that 
 
 161. Id. at 98 (quoting U.N. Docs. E/CN.4/SR.232, 13) (emphasis omitted). 
 162. Id. at 98 (quoting U.N. Docs. E/CN.4/SR.233, 11–12). 
 163. Id. at 108. 
 164. Id. at 110. 
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facilitating these rights are a domestic state responsibility, he wrote, 
“The idea is to help governments to fulfil their obligations rather 
than to penalize them for violations; and use is made of the 
technical assistance program.”165 
As originally conceived, all of the rights in the Universal 
Declaration were meant to work together. Economic, social, and 
cultural rights were supposed to be necessary pre-conditions for 
the exercise of civil and political rights.166 The U.N. General 
Assembly resolution calling for a binding follow-up to the 
declaration had, after all, expressly contemplated that all of the 
rights needed to coexist, observing, 
[T]he enjoyment of civil and political freedoms and of economic, 
social and cultural rights are interconnected and 
interdependent. . . . [W]hen deprived of economic, social, and 
cultural rights, man does not represent the human person whom 
the Universal Declaration [of Human Rights] regards as the ideal 
of the free man.167 
But it was not to be. Recognizing the impasse, India proposed 
to split the two sets of rights into the two separate covenants that 
now exist.168 The United States supported this; the Soviet Union 
opposed but was ultimately overruled dozens of meetings and 
multiple votes later.169 
Even after the proposed “International Bill of Rights” was split 
into two, it would still take decades to complete them: the U.N. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and 
the U.N. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) were each adopted in 1966 and ratified in 1976. 
For the United States, Jimmy Carter, the first Democratic President 
since their adoption, signed both in 1977. And the U.S. Senate 
ratified ICCPR in 1992, within months of also passing the 
 
 165. Id. at 102 (quoting 2 JOHN HUMPHREY, ON THE EDGE OF GREATNESS: THE DIARIES OF 
JOHN HUMPHREY, FIRST DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED NATIONS DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 
1950–1951, 210 (A.J. Hobbins ed., McGill University Libraries, 1996)). 
 166. Id. at 106. 
 167. G.A. Res. 421(V), ¶ 6 (Dec. 4, 1950). 
 168. WHELAN, supra note 159, at 106. 
 169. Id. at 107. 
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FREEDOM Support Act to promote democracy in former Soviet 
states.170 As of 2020, the U.S. Senate has not ratified ICESCR. 
For its part, the ICCPR acknowledged the link between civil and 
political rights and those in the ICESCR. Article 1(1) states, “All 
peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right 
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social, and cultural development.”171 It sets out the 
following civil and political rights: 
Article 6: Right to life. “Every human being has the inherent right 
to life. . . . No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.” 
Article 7: Prohibition on “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 
or punishment.” 
Article 8: Ban on slavery. 
Article 9: “Everyone has the right to liberty and security 
of person.” 
Article 14: Rule of law. “All persons shall be equal before the 
courts and tribunals.” 
Article 17: Right to Privacy. “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home, 
or correspondence . . . .” 
Article 18: “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion.” 
Article 19: Freedom of expression. 
Article 21: “The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized.” 
Article 22: Freedom of association. 
Article 25: Right to vote. “Every citizen shall have the right and 
the opportunity . . . without unreasonable restrictions: (a) To take 
part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely 
chosen representatives; (b) To vote . . . at genuine periodic 
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall 
 
 170. Jimmy Carter, U.S. Finally Ratifies Human Rights Covenant, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (Jun. 29, 1992), https://www.cartercenter.org/news/documents/doc1369.html; 
Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 
1992, Pub. L. No. 102–511, 106 Stat. 3320. 
 171. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, ¶ 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
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be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the 
will of the electors.”172 
The ICESCR has the same Article 1(1) as the ICCPR, further 
linking the two sets of rights.173 Its Preamble recognizes that 
in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and 
want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby 
everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights, as 
well as his civil and political rights.174 
The ICESCR clause on state responsibility and international 
cooperation, Article 2(1), provides: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take 
steps, individually and through international assistance and co-
operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of 
its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the 
full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant 
by all appropriate means . . . .175 
So, each state party accepted the responsibility to work toward 
full realization of these rights, subject to trade-offs they may make 
based on financial and other constraints. They committed to 
collaborate through international assistance, but this collaboration 
was left to discretion and negotiation; it is not automatic or 
compelled. The specific rights the state parties committed to work 
toward include the following: 
Article 7: Labor rights. “[T]he right of everyone to the enjoyment 
of just and favourable conditions of work,” which expressly 
includes fair pay; living wages (“a decent living for themselves 
and their families”); and “[s]afe and healthy working conditions.” 
Article 9: Social security, “including social insurance,” i.e., a social 
safety net. 
Article 11: Freedom from hunger. Anti-poverty protections (as an 
aspirational goal that may require voluntary foreign aid). “[T]he 
right of everyone to an adequate standard of living . . . including 
 
 172. Id. arts. 6–9, 14, 17–19, 21–22, 25. 
 173. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1, ¶ 1, Dec. 
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 174. Id. pmbl. 
 175. Id. art. 2, ¶ 1. 
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adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous 
improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take 
appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, 
recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international 
co-operation based on free consent.” 
Article 12: Health care. “[T]he right of everyone to the enjoyment 
of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.” 
Article 13: Education as a necessary condition for full exercise of 
political and other rights. “[T]he right of everyone to education. 
[States Parties] agree that education shall be directed to the full 
development of the human personality and the sense of its 
dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. They further agree that education shall 
enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society, 
promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all 
nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups, and further the 
activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.” 
This provision states that primary education “shall be compulsory 
and available free to all,” and secondary and higher education 
shall be made generally available and “accessible to all,” with a 
goal of “the progressive introduction of free education.”176 
The enforcement mechanism here—more appropriately 
described as an implementation monitoring process—is for the 
States Parties to submit periodic progress reports to ECOSOC, 
which can inform development assistance activities of U.N. 
agencies and other governments.177 ECOSOC may also forward 
reports and information to the Commission on Human Rights 
for recommendations.178 
The arc of “development” enterprise, from the concept of state 
sovereignty to popular sovereignty to colonialism to the 
unwinding of colonial empires has held to a pattern: the great 
powers of their eras dictated to the rest of the world the standards 
for legitimate and functional statehood; as they clarified these 
concepts, two ideas remained constant: they should not be judged 
by these standards, and they should not be forced to assist in other 
states’ attainment thereof. 
 
 176. Id. arts. 7, 9, 11–13. 
 177. Id. arts. 16–22. 
 178. Id. art. 29. 
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F. Enter “the Right to Development”: The Developing 
Countries’ Response 
By the 1970s, the ranks of former colonies and other newly 
independent members of the United Nations had reached a critical 
mass, and they had a forum—for nonbinding declarations, at 
least—in the General Assembly. Several allied to articulate a 
developing country perspective in the international discourse. 
Their first sustained response was a proposal for a “new 
international economic order” (NIEO), which would re-shape 
institutions and relationships away from great power dominance 
toward a more level playing field.179 It did not succeed, but it 
introduced concepts that have helped shape the development 
dialogue, including the idea of the right to development. 
In 1986, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Declaration on 
the Right to Development as a nonbinding resolution.180 Its 
preamble observed “that under the provisions of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights everyone is entitled to a social and 
international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in 
that Declaration can be fully realized” (also citing the ICCPR and 
ICESCR).181 Its articles expressly framed the full range of civil, 
political, economic, social, and cultural rights as “indivisible and 
interdependent” human rights and state responsibilities:182 
Article 1(1): The right to development is an inalienable human right by 
virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled 
to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural 
and political development, in which all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms can be fully realized. 
Article 3(1): States have the primary responsibility for the creation of 
national and international conditions favourable to the realization 
of the right to development. 
Article 6: 
. . . . 
 
 179. ISABELLA BUNN, THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: 
LEGAL AND MORAL DIMENSIONS 35–36 (2012). 
 180. G.A. Res. 41/128, supra note 5, pmbl. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
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All human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and 
interdependent; equal attention and urgent consideration should be 
given to the implementation, promotion and protection of civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights. 
States should take steps to eliminate obstacles to development 
resulting from failure to observe civil and political rights, as well as 
economic, social and cultural rights.183 
It also calls for an international responsibility or duty to provide 
development assistance: 
Article 3(3): States have the duty to cooperate with each other in 
ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to development. 
States should realize their rights and fulfil their duties in such 
manner as to promote a new international economic order based 
on sovereign equality, interdependence, mutual interest and 
cooperation among all States . . . .184 
This, predictably, has been the main obstacle to donor 
government support. The United States voted against this 
nonbinding resolution; eight other donor governments 
abstained.185 For the United States, the Reagan administration 
expressed ideological opposition to economic, social, and cultural 
rights. In the drafting negotiations, U.S. representative Michel 
Novak rejected the idea of a right to international assistance, 
asserting that individuals had a responsibility to develop 
themselves. In his words, 
[I]n addressing this item, my delegation finds it useful to translate 
the phrase “right to development” into terms rooted in our 
own experience. . . . 
In 1881 . . . no one spoke of a “right to development.” But our 
nation had an opportunity to develop, perhaps even a responsibility 
to develop. Our people knew that a responsibility to develop was 
imposed on them by their own capabilities and blessings, and by 
their new ideas about political economy.186 
 
 183. Id. arts. 1, 3, 6 (emphasis added). 
 184. Id. art. 3, ¶ 3. 
 185. Stephen Marks, The Human Right to Development: Between Rhetoric and Reality, 17 
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 137, 138, 142–43 (2004). 
 186. Id. at 144 (perhaps making a cultural assertion, evoking Max Weber’s “Protestant 
Work Ethic”). 
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This was an ahistorical assertion, to put it mildly, ignoring 
among other things the developmental gains in the United States 
that resulted from the New Deal era. Regardless, the U.S. 
delegation also expressed a longstanding, ideologically neutral U.S. 
position that foreign assistance should be a foreign policy tool 
subject to each government’s discretion, not a compulsion or duty. 
U.S. administrations have consistently opposed a binding 
commitment to provide international assistance for a right to 
development. Even the Democratic Clinton and Obama 
administrations consistently abstained from any measures 
advancing a “right to development.”187 
Notably, around the same time as the Declaration on the Right 
to Development, a separate U.N. World Commission on 
Environment and Development issued a report in 1987, Our 
Common Future (also referred to as the Bruntland Report) that 
created the term “sustainable development.” It framed the 
environment as a global commons and international security issue, 
for which all states should take additional precautions and incur 
additional costs when implementing development activities.188 It 
proposed additional burdens on states, to which a coalition of 
developing countries responded by calling on donor governments 
to facilitate “technology transfer”—to help them gain access to 
industrial technology at less than full market costs. To this day, 
there have been no concrete commitments on this—per the donor 
government position that they should not be compelled to provide 
foreign assistance, though they may choose to as a matter of foreign 
policy discretion.189 
Since then, the most notable statements of international 
expectations for state responsibility for development are the 2000 
 
 187. See, e.g., U.S. MISSION TO INT’L ORG. IN GENEVA, Item 1: Decision Adoption— 
EOV by the United States of America—Right to Development Resolution (Oct. 1, 2009), 
https://geneva.usmission.gov/2009/10/01/item-1-right-to-development/. 
 188. WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE, ch. 1, ¶ 27 (1987), 
http://www.un-documents.net/our-common-future.pdf. 
 189. For example, for all the urgency of the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change, 
the agreement itself only goes so far as to “recognize the importance of . . . technology 
transfer and capacity-building,” committing “[d]eveloped country Parties” only to “provide 
information on financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support provided to 
developing country Parties.” Framework Convention on Climate Change,  
Paris Agreement, art. 6, ¶ 8, art. 13, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Jan. 29, 2016), 
https://unfccc.int/process/conferences/pastconferences/paris-climate-change-conference-
november-2015/paris-agreement. 
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U.N. Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the follow-on 
2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The nonbinding 2000 
U.N. Millennium Declaration observed, “Responsibility for 
managing worldwide economic and social development, as well as 
threats to international peace and security, must be shared among 
the nations of the world and should be exercised multilaterally.”190 
It set out goals in eight areas, including eradicating hunger and 
poverty, achieving universal primary education, improving public 
health infrastructure (with a focus on communicable diseases and 
maternal health), and improving environmental sustainability.191 
The 2015 follow-on SDGs go into more detail, with more 
categories of goals in more areas of governance. These include, 
among others: 
• No poverty, 
• No hunger, 
• Good health, 
• Clean water and sanitation, 
• Renewable energy, 
• Good jobs and economic growth, 
• Innovation and infrastructure, 
• Sustainable cities, 
• Climate action, and 
• Peace and justice.192   
The health goals include “achiev[ing] universal health 
coverage, including financial risk protection.”193 The education 
goals include “free, equitable and quality primary and secondary 
education,” and literacy for all youth.194 The goals for peace and 
justice include promoting rule of law; developing “effective, 
 
 190. G.A. Res. 55/2, United Nations Millennium Declaration (Sept. 18, 2000), 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/55/2. 
 191. Id. 
 192. G.A. Res. 70/1, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/ 
RES/70/1&Lang=E. 
 193. Id. at 16 (Goal 3). 
 194. Id. at 17 (Goal 4). 
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accountable and transparent institutions at all levels”; and ensuring 
“responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-
making at all levels.”195 
Notably, the resolution for the SDGs also expressly invokes the 
Declaration on the Right to Development. It states, 
The new Agenda is guided by the purposes and principles of 
the Charter of the United Nations. . . . It is grounded in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international human 
rights treaties, the Millennium Declaration, and the 2005 World 
Summit Outcome. It is informed by . . . the Declaration on the 
Right to Development.196  
In January 2020, a working group under the U.N. Human 
Rights Council produced a first draft of a proposed binding 
international covenant on the Right to Development. It does well to 
draw many of the connections discussed here, between the rights 
that already exist and between domestic governance and 
international interests. The draft Preamble frames it as 
[e]mphasizing that the right to development is an inalienable 
human right of all human persons and peoples, . . . 
. . . . 
[r]ecognizing that development is a comprehensive economic, 
social, cultural, civil, and political process that aims at the 
constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population 
and of all individuals . . ., 
. . . . 
[r]eaffirming the universality, indivisibility, interrelatedness, 
interdependence, and mutually reinforcing nature of all civil, 
cultural, economic, political and social rights, including the right 
to development, [and] 
. . . . 
[c]onsidering that peace and security at all levels is an essential 
element for the realization of the right to development and that 
such realization can, in turn, contribute to the establishment, 
 
 195. Id. at 25 (Goal 16). 
 196. Id. at 4. 
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maintenance and strengthening of peace and security at 
all levels . . . . 197 
Other provisions assert something that could be interpreted as 
a binding commitment on the international community to provide 
assistance. Draft Article 4, defining the right to development, states, 
 Every human person and all peoples have the inalienable right 
to development by virtue of which they are entitled to participate 
in, contribute to and enjoy economic, social, cultural, civil and 
political development that is consistent with and based on all 
other human rights and fundamental freedoms.198 
The reference to “peoples” raises the possibility that the right is 
more than an individual human right, and potentially also a state 
right at the international level. Articles 10, 11, and 12 describe an 
“obligation to respect,” “obligation to protect,” and “obligation to 
fulfil” the right to development.199 These clearly place a 
responsibility on the state vis-à-vis its people. Articles 12 and 13 go 
potentially further on international cooperation: The former states, 
“Each State Party undertakes to take measures, individually and 
through international assistance and cooperation, with a view to 
progressively enhancing the right to development. . . .”200 The latter 
adds an international “duty to cooperate” through “joint and 
separate action.”201 Based on the history of international 
commitments—in particular, donor states’ reticence to be required 
to provide assistance—a covenant with a provision to this effect is 
extremely unlikely to ever gain the support of the governments 
with the most resources to provide aid. For better or worse, foreign 
intervention or assistance in any form has always been a 
discretionary act. 
At this point, there have been enough statements on the 
appropriate substance of development and the role of the state in 
facilitating it to form a consensus—albeit nonbinding—
understanding. The state is bound internally by the social compact 
 
 197. Draft Convention on the Right to Development, Working Group on the Right to 
Development, Hum. Rts Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.2/21/2 (Jan. 17, 2020), 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Development/Session21/3_A_HRC_WG.2_2
1_2_AdvanceEditedVersion.pdf. 
 198. Id. art. 4 (emphasis added). 
 199. Id. arts. 10–12. 
 200. Id. art. 12. 
 201. Id. art. 13. 
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with its people and externally by its commitments as a member of 
the international community. To the extent there is a human right 
to develop (made up of civil, political, economic, social, and 
cultural rights) and a state responsibility to protect, there is 
necessarily a state responsibility to develop. 
IV. CONCLUSION: SYNTHESIZING A “RESPONSIBILITY TO DEVELOP” 
Across the spectrum of potential motivations for international 
development assistance, from individual human rights to 
international security, there is a common interest in the 
development enterprise among all actors, at the individual, 
national, and international levels. These actors can coordinate 
constructively toward the end of providing meaningful 
international development assistance, or they can negotiate the 
consequences of failures to do so. R2P is now a recognized tool for 
dealing with the consequences—even if it is never used again. 
History shows it has always been an option even before it was ever 
specifically articulated. The RTD campaign has sought to compel 
cooperation to help preempt the R2P option. But history shows that 
is extremely unlikely to happen; foreign assistance has never 
worked that way. A potentially more feasible approach to increase 
the mutually understood urgency of international development 
cooperation would be to more expressly link it to R2P. R2P already 
implicitly includes a broad spectrum of domestic governance 
responsibilities. Expressly agreeing to a domestic “responsibility to 
develop” as a corollary to R2P could help do that. It would not 
compel international assistance, but it could help encourage and 
focus it. 
Re-framing the discourse around a state “responsibility to 
develop” would reduce possible opposition to a binding 
international commitment, while highlighting a link to the 
“responsibility to protect” and potential international security 
implications, which in turn could increase the perceived urgency of 
international assistance. It would keep primary responsibility for 
the development effort, including cultivation of the full range of 
individual human rights, at the individual state level but could help 
the international community—governments and their people—
recognize their self-interest in providing assistance toward 
that purpose. 
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In the one hundred years since the League of Nations Charter 
purportedly drew the line of absolute territorial sovereignty, the 
international community has become increasingly specific about 
the expected responsibilities of a legitimate state. And it has always 
recognized the impact of domestic governance on international 
security, going back to the Treaty of Westphalia. For all the 
individual human rights that have been—and may eventually be—
recognized, the conduct of the state is a necessary condition; the 
state has a counterpart responsibility. Whether the international 
community chooses to enforce it or not, a precedent has been set: 
the state has a responsibility to protect—to provide security and 
respect liberty at home to ensure domestic stability—and in so 
doing contribute to international security. As a necessary condition 
for any human right to development, and as a logical corollary to a 
responsibility to protect, the state has a “responsibility to develop.” 
On this much, there appears to be consensus. Any attempt to seek 
further binding agreement or promote international cooperation 
should focus on that. 
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